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I. INTRODUCTION
The phenomenon of child abuse dates back, no doubt, to the be-
ginnings of mankind and to the first parent who punished his child in an
overly severe manner. The advent of civilization did little to protect the
child from its parents, and, under Roman law, a parent was fit to punish
the child as he wished. This was based on the assumption that since the
parent had given life to the child, he also had the right to take it away.
While this may have reduced behavioral problems, it also left the
child at the mercy of a parent who might be unbalanced, unfit and ready
to inflict severe or fatal punishment for even an imagined wrong.
The common law took a more solicitous view towards children, giving
* Member of the Florida Bar, associated with the firm of Due, Whiteford, Taylor &
Preston, Baltimore, Md.
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the parent the right to discipline his children, but prohibiting him from
inflicting what society believed to be abuse. Society's definition of abuse
has no doubt changed with the times and today is defined by Webster
as "physical ill treatment or injury." Even this definition is not overly
helpful in many cases since what may be considered as an acceptable
mode of punishment in rural areas may be thought of as abusive in a
large metropolis. The age of the child may also be a point of differentia-
tion. Statutes prohibiting child abuse have been common for years, but
they speak in the same general terms. Being criminal in nature, they
ultimately leave the definition to the trier of fact. While this lack of a
specific definition may cause problems for those attempting to study or
write about the phenomenon, it seems to benefit ultimately both the
child and society by setting no arbitrary limits which might later be
regarded as unfortunate. Society knows what abuse is, even without
a specific definition, and may thus approach the problem with the in-
dividual characteristics and the best interests of the child as the primary
considerations.
The first reported case of abuse occurred in 1874 in New York City.
The child involved, a girl named Mary Ellen, was eventually taken in by
the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals after individuals
concerned by her plight convinced the Society that she was a member
of the animal kingdom. The Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to
Children was formed a year later.'
The problem of child abuse has been realistically recognized only
in the last twenty years. It was not until 1946 that the first article ap-
peared in a medical journal attributing traumatic injury to children to
possible parental abuse.2 Slow progress was made for the next fifteen
years with an increasing amount of publication and study on the problem.
In the early 1960's, the term "battered child syndrome" was coined and
nationwide interest followed.' The mass media soon responded and the
problem became the subject of magazine and newspaper articles as well
1. Fontana, The Neglect and Abuse of Children, 64 N.Y.S.J. OF MED. 215-16 (1964).
2. Caffey, Multiple Fractures in the Long Bones of Infants Suffering from Chronic Sub-
dural Hematoma, 56 Am. J. OF ROENTGENOLOGY 163-73 (1946).
3. There is no generally accepted definition of the battered child syndrome. Those which
have been formulated have usually been aimed at selecting cases to be included in a study
and lack universal appeal. Delsordo's explanation has a somewhat more general application
and states:
The "battered child" syndrome takes its name from the fact that the child's injuries
are the result of twisting, throwing, knocking around or some other form of "batter-
ing" by the abusive person. The injuries include bruises, hematoma, and one or a com-
bination of fractures of the arms, legs, skull or ribs.
Delsordo, Protective Casework for Abused Children, 10 CHILDREN 214 (1963). A somewhat
more extensive definition and explanation is given by Connell:
In its most useful concept, definition of the battered child should include all degrees
of violent person-to-child physical assault, and not just those in which bones or vital
organs are damaged, or hospitalization required. Nor should the term be limited to
a child whose aggressor admits inflicting the injuries. Confessions of this import are
rarely made to the physician.
Connell, The Devil's Battered Children, 64 J. KAN. MED. Soc'Y 385-86 (1963).
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as television dramas. In response to an enlightened public outcry,
legislatures acted, often without regard to party lines, and within four
years all fifty states, the District of Columbia and the Virgin Islands
had enacted statutes requiring cases of child abuse to be reported to
the authorities.
II. THE BATTERED CHILD SYNDROME
A. Characteristics of the Child
child was hospitalized at age five months with extensive burns
... after having been fed boiling milk. Following recovery, the
infant was separated temporarily from the parents and placed
in a foster home. The child was returned shortly thereafter by
court order, and at age eight months was admitted to another
hospital with cerebral concussion, skull fracture and nutritional
anemia. The silent, suffering child was unable to protest the
inadequacies of our protective laws and suffered the inevitable
consequence, death, at age three.5
In another case, a six-week-old child was admitted to the hospital
with a swelling of the right thigh of four days duration. The mother
stated that the child had fallen from his crib and struck his leg on the
floor. X-rays revealed a fracture of the right thigh and the child was
discharged two weeks later in good condition with a cast on his hip. A
few weeks later he was admitted to another hospital with multiple
contusions and abrasions. It was learned that the father had thrown
the child on the floor, shattering the cast and inflicting serious head in-
juries. When last seen, the child was blind, mentally retarded and
showed multiple signs of brain damage.'
These cases are only an indication of the injuries which may be
suffered by children who are the victims of parental rage, frustration or
inadequacy. While the child is subject to a wide range of trauma inflicted
by numerous means, certain characteristics repeatedly present them-
selves to the extent that their existence in a given case often leads to a
proper diagnosis in situations where the uninformed might never suspect
abuse.
The battered child is typically young. While various studies come to
4. Articles that appeared are Cole, Terror-Struck Children, The New Republic, May 30,
1964; David, The Shocking Price of Parental Anger, GOOD HOUSEKEEPING, March 1964, at
181-86; DeFrancis, Parents Who Abuse Children, PTA MAGAZINE, Nov. 1963, at 16-18; Earl,
Ten Thousand Children Battered and Starved, Today's Health, Sept. 1965, at 24-31; Flata,
Parents Who Beat Children, SATURDAY EVENING PoST, Oct. 6, 1962, at 30-35; and Oettinger,
Protecting Children from Abuse, PARENTS, Nov. 1964, at 12. Numerous stories have also
appeared in the New York Times. Both the "Ben Casey" and "Dr. Kildare" television series
have included programs set around the battered child.
S. Gillespie, The Battered Child Syndrome: Thermal and Caustic Manifestations, 5
J. OF TRAUMA 523, 529 (1965).
6. Fontana, Donovan & Wong, The "Maltreatment Syndrome" in Children, 269 N. ENG.
J. MED. 1389-90 (1963).
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slightly different results, most agree that he is almost certain to be of
pre-school age and often substantially younger.7 One study included an
infant who suffered abuse on his first day of life,8 and others found that
the majority of their cases involved children a year old or less.' It would
seem obvious from these findings that the children involved could
hardly have provoked their parents intentionally, or even that they
were capable of any substantial amount of mischief.
Cases of abuse are most frequently discovered when the child is
taken to a private physician or hospital for treatment, although some
are reported to the authorities by neighbors, relatives, and even the
non-abusing parent. ° The physical injuries inflicted cover a broad range,
but injuries to the arms, legs and head are most common." Bruises such
as lacerations, old and new abrasions, welts, choke marks and bites are
not uncommon, 2 and thermal injuries have been found in a number of
7. Cameron, Johnson & Camps, The Battered Child Syndrome, 6 MFo. Sci. & L. 2 (1966);
Elmer, Identification of Abused Children, 10 CHILDREN 183 (1963) ; Galdston, Observations
on Children Who Have Been Physically Abused and Their Parents, 122 Am. J. OF PSYCHIATRY
440 (1965); Gillespie, supra note 5, at 523; Ireland, A Registry on Child Abuse, 13 CHILDREN
115 (1966); Kempe, Silverman, Steele, Droegemueller & Silver, The Battered-Child Syndrome,
181 J.A.M.A. 17 (1962). See also, Merrill, Physical Abuse of Children-An Agency Study,
Protecting the Battered Child (Children's Division, American Humane Association) (1962)
Comment, The Child Abuse Problem in Iowa, 53 J. IOWA MED. Soc'y 692 (1963).
Ireland found that in 247 of 363 cases reported the abused child was under five years
of age. Gillespie's study of 19 burned children indicated their average age to be 20 months,
while Cameron's study involving 29 children subjected to various kinds of abuse in England
found 79% to be less than two years old and the mean age to be 14.3 months. In Galdston's
study of abused children seen at Children's Hospital Medical Center in Boston over a five
year period, the largest group fell between the ages of six and 18 months, while the range
extended from three months to three and a half years. The battered child is usually less than
three years old, although Elmer states that the peak incidence is reached at age two to three.
Merrill, somewhat to the contrary, notes that half of the 180 children referred to the
American Humane Association in 1960 were aged seven or under.
8. Gillespie, supra note 5, at 523.
9. Barta & Smith, Willful Trauma to Young Children-A Challenge to the Physician,
2 CLINICAL PEDIATRIcs 545 (1963); Cameron, supra note 7; McHenry, Girdany & Elmer,
Unsuspected Trauma with Multiple Skeletal Injuries During Infancy and Childhood, 31
PEDIATRICS 903 (1963).
In a study by McHenry of 50 children conducted at Children's Hospital in Pittsburgh,
60% were found to be under nine months and over half less than six months old. The peak
age of incidence was three months, although the children's ages ranged from one month to
eight years. Ten children ranged in age from nine to 15 months. Cameron's study reported
55% of the children to be less than a year old. In this connection, Elmer states that the
normal incidence of accidents is minimal among children less than nine months old.
10. Merrill, supra note 7, at 3.
11. Cameron, supra note 7, at 9-10; Kempe, supra note 7, at 21-22.
Injuries to the arms and legs are most common and are usually present even if the most
severe injury is located elsewhere. This is due largely to the fact that these extremities are
easiest for an abuser to grab, and the yanking, jerking, twisting motions that follow produce
injuries. Bruises on the head, face and neck have also been found in a substantial number
of cases. Injuries around the mouth have been seen as efforts to make a child stop crying,
while those on the cheeks or side of the head have been explained as inflicted with an open
hand or fist. Skull injuries are consistent with blows against hard objects such as furniture.
12. Shepherd, The Abused Child and the Law, 22 WASH. & LEE L. Rav. 182 (1965);
Gillespie, supra note 5, at 523-24.
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cases.' 3 Safety pins, paper clips and coins may be found in the gastro-
intestinal tract. 4 Fractures are often distributed about the body, and
x-rays of the skeleton may show previous fractures, some still not yet
fully healed.' 5 "To the informed physician, the bones tell a story the
child is too young or too frightened to tell."'16
The parents are likely to have a variety of explanations for the
child's condition. Seldom do they immediately admit inflicting the in-
juries, instead blaming an accident such as a fall or the aggression of
a sibling. 7 Some claim that the child injured himself or that he just
simply "bruised easily." If no new injuries occur during hospitalization,
it is difficult to believe that "bruising easily" explanation, and it is
more difficult to believe that a small child would intentionally burn
himself repeatedly with cigarettes, pour scalding water on his buttocks
or constantly inflict other painful injuries on himself. 8 Masochism is
simply not common in infants and toddlers.
While authorities believe that many cases of abuse go unreported',
it is probably more correct to say that a large number of cases are not
properly diagnosed. Faced with a child who has been severely beaten,
physicians often refuse to believe that an adult could inflict such harm.' 9
In many cases, the parents may show outward signs of devotion to the
child which induce the physician to fail to consider the possibility of
abuse.2° When the parent gives a reasonably plausible explanation, they
may be too willing to accept it rather than to probe further. Some young
doctors, similarly unwilling to consider wilful abuse, attempt to explain
the bruises and fractures as symptoms of some rare disease.2'
The ever-increasing number of articles in the medical literature
should help the physician to be more aware of the possibility of abuse
when examining children, but this alone will not solve the statistical
13. Gillespie, supra note 5, at 525.
Burns are most often caused by scalding liquids, usually coffee or water. Of the 19
children included in the study, two were forced by their parents to wash their mouths out
with drain cleaner, one was burned with cigarettes and cremation of one child was attempted.
Two children were frostbitten as a result of being forced to take a bath outside in slush
and snow and remain outdoors.
14. Shaw, The Surgeon and the Battered Child, 119 SURGERY, GYNECOLOGY AND
OBSTETRICS 355 (1964).
15. Shepherd, supra note 12, at 192; Fontana, supra note 1, at 1390.
16. Kempe, supra note 7, at 18.
17. Connell states that: "In our experience, the majority of parents deny any knowledge
of willful trauma, though they often recall falls in which the child-though seldom the adult
-may have been injured. Not infrequently a toddling sibling too young to talk is implicated;
the impossibility of prosecuting such a defendant is obvious to everyone, including the
parents." Connell, supra note 3, at 386.
18. Gillespie, supra note 5, at 528; Comment, The California Legislative Approach to
Problems of Willful Child Abuse, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 1805 (1966).
19. CALIF. L. REv., supra note 18, at 1809; Kempe, supra note 7, at 19; Bain, Com-
mentary, The Physically Abused Child, 31 PEDIATRICS 895-96 (1963).
20. Fontana, supra note 1, at 1392.
21. Bain, supra note 19, at 896.
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problem. The fact remains that many physicians who might see abused
children fail to report and many who have substantial reason to believe
that a child has been battered fail to act. A survey of physicians in the
Washington metropolitan area disclosed that "a fifth of the nearly 200
physicians questioned said that they rarely or never considered the
'battered child syndrome' when seeing an injured child and a fourth said
that they would not report a suspected case even if protected by law
against legal action by the parents."22 The reasons for this are numerous.
Some, unsure of their diagnosis, feel that an accusation would be out of
place on the basis of their evidence. As battering parents seldom take
the child to the same doctor or hospital twice, the examining physician
is unable to see any pattern.23 Other physicians feel that their duty is
medical rather than social and consider their job finished when the child
has been treated. 24 Still others fear civil litigation stemming from an
accusation of abuse or are reluctant to take part in a criminal proceeding
that might result from a report to the authorities. 5 Unfortunately, it
is the child who ultimately ends up paying, somtimes with his young
life, for the missed diagnosis or hesitation of these practitioners.
The symptoms of the battered child syndrome should sound a loud
alarm to physicians treating a child exhibiting them. While not all
abused children will show all of these symptoms, presence of four or
more should raise a strong suspicion. The symptoms include age of the
child, a distribution of fractures, a disproportionate amount of soft
tissue injury, injuries in different stages of healing, the cause of the recent
trauma, a suspicious family history, and the absence of any new lesions
during the period of hospitalization. 6
A physician needs to have a high level of suspicion of the diag-
nosis of the battered-child syndrome in instances of subdural
hematoma, multiple unexplained fractures at different stages
of healing, failure to thrive, when soft tissue swellings or skin
22. Wasserman, The Abused Parent of the Abused Child, 14 CHLDREN 175 (1967).
23. Hansen, Child Abuse Legislation, 52 A.B.A.J. 734, 736 (1966); but see Ireland,
supra note 7, at 115.
24. Bain, supra note 19.
25. Id.
26. Cameron, supra note 7, at 7; Connell, supra note 3, at 391; Delsordo, supra note
3, at 214; Elmer, supra note 7, at 182; Ireland, supra note 7, at 115; Shepherd, supra note
12, at 192.
The increasing importance of fractures in making the diagnosis of abuse has been
noted by Elmer, who states that:
multiple bone injuries, especially in a very young child, are now clinically
recognized as a flagrant sign of danger in the child's environment. Without a glimpse
of the family or a word of history, the clinician who is confronted with them
knows that family factors are of primary importance for the understanding of the
child and his injuries.
Further, Ireland found in one study that beatings and fractures accounted for two-thirds
of the abuse reported. However, a caveat must be added to this: Fontana has warned that
the physician must consider the possibility that skeletal manifestations are due to a prolonged
and difficult labor at birth. Fontana, supra note 6, at 1391.
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bruising are present, or in any other situation where the degree
and type of injury is at variance with the history given regard-
ing its occurrence or in any child who dies suddenly.2"
In most cases the child has been well fed and cared for, indicating that
the parent has at least some sense of. responsibility.
8
The battered child, upon admission to the hospital, exhibits a per-
sonality shaped by his previous treatment. While he is unlikely to be
mentally retarded or physically defective, his relationship with the
abusive parent is often understandably poor. He cries unceasingly while
being treated or examined, but very little at other times. He does not
look at his parents for assurance and shows no real expectation of being
comforted. He is wary of physical contact initiated by anyone, may
manifest fright by whimpering or attempting to hide under the sheets,
and tends to over-react to hostility. He becomes apprehensive when other
children cry and are approached by an adult, yet watches the situation
with curiosity. He seems to seek safety in sizing up the situation rather
than from his parents whom he fears. He is constantly on the alert for
danger, yet is less afraid when admitted to a ward than other children
and settles in quickly. He is constantly asking in words or actions what
will happen next. His personality is depressed and generally passive and,
if old enough to speak, asks when he is going home or states that he does
not want to go home. When informed of his impending release, he ex-
hibits a disinterested look and retreats into himself. In some of the more
severe cases the child may show a profound apathy to the point of
stupor, a condition resembling cases of "shell-shock" in adults. He may
show little external manifestation of inner life and instead, lie or sit
motionless and unresponsive to all attempts to evoke some recognition
of the world around him. He differs from the schizophrenic or autistic
child in that his behavior is not bizarre, but rather his inner life seems
to be completely suspended." "In general, cared-for children turn to
their parents for safety in life. Neglected and battered children endure
life as if they are alone in a dangerous world with no real hope of
safety."" °
B. Characteristics of the Abusive Parent
The battering parent presents a personality pattern as unique as
that of his child. Studies show that mothers and fathers are equally
likely to be abusive, and that children of both sexes are equally likely
to be victims. However, the parent is more likely to batter a child of
27. Merrill, supra note 7, at 4.
28. Cameron, supra note 7, at 4; Merrill, supra note 7, at 4.
29. Morris, Gould & Matthews, Toward Prevention of Child Abuse, 11 CEMDR€N 59
(1964); Legislation: The Battered Child: Florida's Mandatory Reporting Statute, 18 FtA. L.
REv. 503, 506 (1965) ; Merrill, supra note 7, at 6.
30. Morris, supra note 29.
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [VoL. XXIII
the same sex." One author reported twenty-one percent of the abusive
mothers to be pregnant at the time of the assault."2 Studies vary on
patterns of abuse, some finding that one child in the family is singled
out while others reporting that abuse is more evenly distributed among
several or all of the offspring.33 In some cases, the youngest child is
battered methodically, escaping only by the birth of another. 4
Battering seems to occur in both white and colored families35 and
at all levels of society and education, but is more easily concealed by
the more affluent. Even among those with a good education and stable
financial and social backgrounds, it would appear that there is a flaw
in character structure which permits aggressive impulses to be too freely
expressed.36 As a result, the typical abusive parent is thought of as
undereducated and from a lower financial and social level." In most
cases, the abused child was unwanted. Often he was illegitimate, con-
ceived out of wedlock or at a time deemed inconvenient by the parents .3
The intelligence of these parents has often been judged to be low. One
British study found that only thirty percent of the fathers and seven
percent of the mothers were of average intelligence, while the intelligence
of eighteen percent of the fathers and thirty-four percent of the mothers
was classified as very low. In accordance with this, the parents' occu-
pations were found to usually require little mental ability.
39
31. Cameron, supra note 7, at 18; Merrill, supra note 7, at 4.
32. Cameron, supra note 7, at 18.
33. Cameron, supra note 7, at 11; Kempe, supra note 7, at 18-19; Merrill, supra note
7, at 6.
Cameron reported that in 32% of the cases in which a child died after abuse, another
child in the family had previously been abused.
34. Cameron, supra note 7, at 14-15.
35. Cameron, supra note 7, at 16-17; Adelson, Slaughter of the Innocents-A Study of
Forty-Six Homicides in Which the Victims Were Children, 264 N.E. J. MED. 1345 (1961).
Cameron found that colored children were more likely to be abused than white children,
but Adelson found that the incidence of homicides among the two races was in proportion to
their percentage of the population. Neither study is thought to be conclusive of the battering
problem in this country as Cameron's study was conducted in England and Adelson's dealt
with homicides in a variety of circumstances rather than just in cases of abuse.
36. Kempe, supra note 7, at 18.
37. Barta, supra note 9, at 553; Galdston, supra note 7, at 441; Kempe, supra note 7,
at 18; McCoid, The Battered Child and Other Assaults Upon the Family: Part One, 50
MrNN. L. Rv. 18 (1965); Morris, supra note 29, at 441; Rubin, The Need for Intervention,
24 PUB. WELFARE 231 (1966); Wasserman, supra note 22, at 176.
While upper class ability to conceal abuse contributes to findings that a large number
of cases involve poorly-educated parents, another factor to be considered is that the location
of a hospital conducting a study may greatly influence the type of family who uses it. A
hospital in a poor section of town is far more likely to come in contact with disadvantaged
families than hospitals located in more affluent areas.
38. Cameron, supra note 7, at 14; Delsordo, supra note 3, at 216; Gillespie, supra note
5, at 527; Kempe, supra note 7, at 18; contra, Comment, The Child Abuse Problem in Iowa,
supra note 7, at 692.
Cameron found that 66% of the abused children studied were either illegitimate,
conceived before marriage or stated to be unwanted. However, an Iowa study involving
71 children found all but one to be legitimate.
39. Cameron, supra note 7, at 16-18; accord; Harper, The Physician, the Battered Child
and the Law, 31 PEDIATRCS 899 (1963); Kempe, supra note 7, at 18.
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Marital instability is present in the majority of cases4" and conflict
among the abusive parent and other family members has often been
noted.4 In some cases, the non-abusive parent has taken the child and
left the battering parent, but such separations are seldom permanent and,
unless the underlying cause of the abuse is found and treated, any im-
provement in the child's environment is temporary.
Studies have consistently shown that alcoholism, sexual promiscuity,
minor criminal activities, impulsiveness, hypersensitivity, poorly con-
trolled tempers, self-centeredness and immaturity are common among
these parents.4 2 Most of them married young43 with the abused child
often born soon thereafter.44 In some other cases, the abusive parent is
physically disabled or mentally retarded.4 5 While serious financial diffi-
culties or real ignorance were not present in most of the cases,46 the youth
and lack of education of most parents can be seen to have possibly pro-
duced stresses with which they were unable to cope successfully.47 Older
abusive parents had usually lived in the area for years and were self-sup-
porting, but were reported to be poorly integrated with or accepted by
the community as evidenced by the fact that ninety percent were felt
to have serious social problems.4" "Rarely is child abuse the product
of wanton, willful or deliberate acts of cruelty, but usually is the result
of emotional immaturity and lack of capacity for coping with the pres-
sures and tensions of modern living."49 In many instances, the child
becomes the scapegoat for these problems5" and, unable to retaliate ef-
To this must be added the previously mentioned caveat. Those with average or better
intelligence are in a better position to avoid becoming part of the studies dealing with abuse.
40. Cameron, supra note 7, at 17; Delsordo, supra note 3, at 214-16; Kempe, supra
note 7, at 18; McCoid, supra note 37, at 18-19; McHenry, supra note 9, at 907; Wasserman,
supra note 22, at 176.
41. Wasserman, supra note 22, at 176.
42. Cameron, supra note 7, at 17; DeFrancis, Child Abuse-The Legislative Response,
44 DENVER L.J. 3, 6 (1967); Gillespie, supra note 5, at 527; Harper, supra note 39, at 899;
Kempe, supra note 7, at 18; McCoid, supra note 37, at 18; McHenry, supra note 9, at 907;
Comment, The Child Abuse Problem in Iowa, supra note 7, at 693.
To the contrary, Merrill states that most parents had never had serious trouble with
the law, although some had displayed some socially disapproved behavior. Barta, in addition,
noted that only one abusive mother in his study had previously been known to a law
enforcement or social welfare agency. Merrill, supra note 7, at 6; Barta, supra note 9, at
553.
43. Cameron, supra note 7, at 14; Delsordo, supra note 3, at 216; Galdston, supra note
7, at 441; Kempe, supra note 7, at 18; Merrill, supra note 7, at 4; Comment, The Child
Abuse Problem in Iowa, supra note 7, at 693.
44. Merrill, supra note 7, at 3.
45. McHenry, supra note 9, at 907.
46. Galdston, supra note 7, at 441.
47. McHenry, supra note 9, at 907.
48. Older abusive parents had usually lived in the area for years and were self-supporting,
but were reported to be poorly integrated with or accepted by the community as evidenced
by the fact that 90% were felt to have serious social problems. Merrill, supra note 7, at 3.
49. DeFrancis, supra note 42, at 6.
50. McCoid, supra note 37, at 19; Comment, The Child Abuse Problem in Iowa, supra
note 7, at 693.
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fectively to the situation, provides an ideal target. One author has re-
ferred to the child in these circumstances as a "hostility sponge.")
51
Authorities differ on the existence of serious mental illness in these
parents; some feel them to be psychopathic or schizophrenic,52 while
others report little psychosis but rather a marked inability to set up a
genuine relationship with another human being.5" Parents who were
reported to be non-psychotic were often found to be unable to sympathize
with the feelings of others. While they showed little remorse for their
actions and were often unconcerned with their child's welfare, they could
be very much concerned about the results their actions might bring from
those in authority.
54
It is interesting to note that many abusive parents were them-
selves emotionally deprived or battered as children."' It thus seems that
the problem is one that is largely passed from generation to generation.
It is understandable that the abused and rejected child might easily
turn into an insecure and unstable adult. This may serve to explain why
the child is sometimes perceived by these parents as a competitor for
the attention and affection of others.56 In some cases the parents seem
to recognize the seriousness of their acts and some authorities feel that
they are actually seeking help for themselves as much as for the injured
child when they take him for medical treatment.5 7 One author states
that:
parents who neglect and batter their children are actually
speaking their parental incapacities in action language and are
asking to be stopped in behaving as they do. Why else do they
bring their children to hospitals and so run a high risk of
punishment? We think that parents run this risk because the
risk of total, internal, personality disintegration is even more
terrifying-a risk they run in continuing the care of their
children. 8
In other cases, the act of abuse itself may be the parent's plea for help
that he is too proud or too embarrassed to make in any other way. While
the battering parent needs help and understanding, his actions towards
hospitals, law enforcement authorities, social workers and the courts
are often calculated to bring about the opposite treatment. Provocation
directed at these potentially helpful sources may result in rejection
51. Wasserman, supra note 22, at 177.
52. Delsordo, supra note 3, at 214; Gillespie, supra note 5, at 527; Harper, supra note
39, at 899; Kempe, supra note 7, at 18; McHenry, supra note 9, at 907; Comment, The Child
Abuse Problem in Iowa, supra note 7, at 693.
53. Wasserman, supra note 22, at 177.
54. Id.
55. Harper supra note 39, at 899; Kempe, supra note 7, at 18; McCoid, supra note 37,
at 6; McHenry, supra note 9, at 907; Morris, supra note 29, at 60.
56. Delsordo, supra note 3, at 216.
57. Wasserman, supra note 22, at 177.
58. Morris, supra note 29, at 56.
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similar to that suffered as a child and may possibly satisfy the parent's
inner sense of a need of punishment for his guilt.8 9
Attempts have been made to catalogue the types of abuse inflicted
and the differing backgrounds that seem to produce it. While there seems
to be no substantial amount of agreement on these views, they produce
an interesting picture of the situation.
A British study of 29 abused children attempted to subdivide the
syndrome into four classes based largely on the state of mind of the
abusive parent.60 The first subdivision included cases that were clearly
murder and which were intended as such by the parent. The second
included cases where frequent acts of violence ultimately terminated in
the child's death. The actual intent to kill the child seems to be missing
here, but the pattern of apparently intentional abuse carried out method-
ically has achieved the same result. The third subdivision dealt with
cases where acts of violence took place on the spur of the moment, re-
sulting in death. These acts often occurred when the parent was drunk
or consumed by a fit of temper. There seems to have been no precon-
ceived plan to kill the child and the death was more the result of the
parent's inability to control himself. The fourth category was composed
of cases involving children who were abused by foster parents. Other
studies have shown that natural parents commit the abusive acts in the
majority of cases"1 and this category is thought to be a catch-all for
foster parents because the number of cases was too small to justify
further subdivision. It was further reported that differentiation between
the second and third categories was aided by the fact that children
subjected to frequent intentional abuse tended to be underweight while
those who suffered from spur of the moment acts of violence were usually
of normal weight and size.
2
Another study attempted to group abusive parents according to
"clusters of personality characteristics." The first cluster was composed
mainly of mothers with internal conflicts. They were hostile, aggressive
and constantly angry. This was thought to be related to severe emotional
rejection and deprivation suffered by the mother as a child. The few
fathers who fell within this group were likely to express their feelings
outside the home as well, their behavior sometimes producing serious
59. Wasserman, supra note 22, at 179.
60. Cameron, supra note 7, at 18.
61. Adelson, supra note 35, at 1346; Ireland, supra note 7, at 115; Merrill, supra note
7, at 4.
Ireland reported that parents inflicted the abuse in approximately two-thirds of the cases
studied. Merrill's study indicates that parents were the abusers in 86% of the cases and that
these abusive parents usually lived with the children. Adelson found that the 46 children
whose deaths he studied had been killed by 41 persons, 36 of whom were parents or stood
in loco parentis. However, the implications of this finding in a pure abuse situation are
uncertain as some of the children included in his study were the victims of attempts by the
parent to wipe out the entire family, rather than of the battered child syndrome.
62. Cameron, supra note 7, at 18.
63. Merrill, supra note 7, at 4-5.
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consequences. The second cluster was filled with parents with rigid and
compulsive personalities who lacked warmth, reasonableness and pli-
ability in their thinking and beliefs. They defended their acts of abuse
and the mothers often openly rejected their children. These mothers
were primarily concerned with their own pleasures and were unable to
feel love or protection for their children. Oftentimes the children were
blamed by the parents for their various difficulties. The third cluster
was comprised of parents with passive and dependent personalities. They
often competed with their children for their spouse's love, and were
generally depressed, sad, moody, unresponsive and unhappy. They lacked
maturity and seemed uncertain of what they wanted in life. This uncer-
tainty extended to their desire to be married, to have children, and to
have a home of their own. The fourth cluster was composed mainly of
fathers unable to work because of a physical disability. The mothers
supported the family in these cases but the father exerted strong dis-
cipline and control in a home where the atmosphere was often rigid and
controlled. These fathers were often young and intelligent and felt an
acute loss of pride and status due to their disabilities.
The same role-reversal found in the fourth cluster has been noted
in other studies but with different effects.64 In these reports the wives
who worked were quite masculine in appearance and demeanor while
their husbands were passive and retiring. The careers of these mothers
have often been found to be a means of withdrawal from the child, whose
behavior they interpreted as deliberate and intentional. The actual
abuse in these cases often followed a breakdown of this arrangement
which required the mother to remain at home with her children and made
further withdrawal impossible. In these situations the mother was the
abusive parent, and it seems that where role-reversal is present, the
dominant and controlling parents is likely to be the abuser.
A third study attempted to classify abuse according to the emotional
difficulties that caused it. 5 This study was based on investigation of
cases involving 80 abused and battered children. Four of the children in
this study were abused by parents with actual mental illness, two of
whom were unwed mothers. In the other two cases, the father was the
abuser and the home showed severe marital conflict. The method of
abuse in these cases was ritualistic rather than impulsive, and this
would seem to accord with the second subdivision of the British report.
Thirteen cases resulted from what was termed "overflow abuse" from
parents, usually mothers, who were unable to cope with responsibility.
Over half of the homes lacked a father and those with two parents were
marked by a history of severe marital conflict. The children who suffered
this abuse were usually over five years of age, somewhat older than the
64. Galdston, supra note 7, at 442; Comment, The Child Abuse Problem in Iowa, supra
note 7, at 693.
65. Delsordo, supra note 3, at 214-16.
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typical battered child. These parents were diagnosed as having "inade-
quate personalities." Eight cases were classified as "battered child
abuse." In two of the families involved, more than one child was abused.
The case histories of these families showed conflict either between the
parents or between the abusing parent and a significant relative. The
child was perceived as a competitor or a burden to be destroyed or
made to suffer. Twelve of the cases were termed "disciplinary abuse."
Most of the children involved were adolescents, and only one child was
under age seven. The abuser was usually rigid and unfeeling and the
abuse commonly followed failure to comply with parental expectations
or commission of a forbidden act. Five of the abusers were parent sub-
stitutes who cared for the child because of parental default rather than
by their own choice. The abuse in these cases was not restricted to one
child and usually took the form of beatings with a strap, rope, stick or
similar article. This classification would seem to be a combination of
the fourth subdivision of the British study and the third personality
cluster in the previous study. Forty-three cases were classified as "mis-
placed abuse." The child in these cases was often illegitimate, conceived
before marriage, brain damaged, or a pawn in a marital conflict. In
some cases, the child's behavior leading to the abuse was attributed to
the birth of a sibling. The children involved in these batterings were
seldom found to be in danger of death and their parents often showed
remorse, making a solution for the problem more possible. The fathers,
usually the abusers in these situations, were often mismatched with
their wives, a fact probably aided by premarital conception and which
contributed to the marital conflict. In some instances there was a history
of the child having been cared for by a parent substitute. Only one child
was normally beaten in multiple child families, and most of these children
were aged five or over. The abuse was usually administered by fists or
a strap and was possibly brought on by bed-wetting, truancy, fire-
setting or withdrawal evidenced by a number of these children.
Once the battered child is taken to the hospital for treatment, the
parents are likely to display a set of characteristics, reactions and atti-
tudes as distinctive as those exhibited by the child. They do not volunteer
information about the child's injury and are evasive or contradict them-
selves regarding the circumstances under which it occurred. They become
irritable when asked how the child's symptoms developed. They seem
critical of the child, angry at him for being injured, and give no indica-
tion of any feeling of guilt or remorse regarding his condition. They
either show no concern about his injury or are overly inquisitive, solici-
tous and prying, but often disappear from the hospital while the child is
being examined or shortly after he is admitted. They tend not to visit
the child while he is hospitalized and, during any visits which may occur,
seldom touch or look at him. They do not involve themselves in the
child's care or inquire about his discharge and ask to take him home
1969]
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only when frightened by interrogation. They do not ask about post-hos-
pital care. Their concern seems to be mainly what will happen to them-
selves and others responsible for the child's injury. They maintain that
the child injured himself and act as though his injuries are an assault on
them. They either fail to respond to the child or respond inappropriately
and give no indication of having any perception of how the child could feel,
physically or emotionally. They constantly criticize the child and never
mention the existence of any good quality in him. They show no under-
standing of the rights of others and are preoccupied with themselves and
the concrete things in life, although they are often neglectful of their own
physical health. They exhibit violent feelings. They reveal that such a
pattern of violence surrounded them as children and that they are con-
cerned about having been abandoned and punished by their parents. They
may exhibit a longing for their mothers. Perhaps the most telling of all
characteristics exhibited is their overwhelming feeling that both they and
their children are worthless.06
These characteristics of the syndrome must be understood in order
to deal effectively with the abuse problem and the possible solutions
which may be available. It is easy for the uninformed to state that
punishment of the parent is an expedient and simple remedy. Such feel-
ings stem from a natural repugnance experienced by those who know
only of the injuries inflicted on the child. These people cannot under-
stand what causes an adult to inflict serious injuries on a defenseless
child. The facts remain, however,, that some children are more difficult
to handle than others and that biological parenthood is no guarantee
of fitness to raise any child, let alone one who may present problems. In
this connection, it must be decided whether punishment of the abusive
parent or solving the larger problem of getting to the reason for the
abuse is to be the main objective, although it is admitted that, in some
instances, punishment may be warranted as one means of bringing about
a solution.
If the improper decision is made, serious and sometimes fatal conse-
quences may ensue for the child. "Knowledgeable professional persons
now believe that a child with multiple bone injuries has a 50-50 chance
of being reinjured should he return to his usual habitat following hospi-
talization." 7 Furthermore, studies have shown that approximately 10
percent of the children who survive long enough to receive medical
attention later die, either from the injuries that first brought them to
the physician or hospital or from subsequently inflicted trauma."8 A
66. Connell, supra note 3, at 391; Galdston, supra note 7, at 440; McHenry, supra note
9, at 907; Morris, supra note 29, at 56-57.
67. Elmer, supra note 7, at 181.
68. Elmer, supra note 7, at 183; Gillespie, supra note 5, at 527; Kempe, supra note 7, at
17; McHenry, supra note 9, at 906; Comment, The Child Abuse Problem in Iowa, supra
note 7, at 692.
Elmer and McHenry reported that of 50 children seen at Children's Hospital in
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number of those who survive suffer permanent brain damage or are
seriously crippled. 9
III. SOLVING THE FAMILY PROBLEM
A. The Punishment-Rehabilitation Conflict
Modern legal theory is making greater and more rapid inroads in the
area of family law than perhaps in any other field. This is readily
visible in the area of child abuse, which contains components of both
criminal and family law. Abusing a child is a statutory offense in all
states, and criminal penalties are provided. However, the modern trend
is to reduce use of these sanctions except in the more severe and aggra-
vated cases and to attempt to prevent further incidents of a similar
nature through concentrated social casework. This is a significant de-
parture from the normal criminal case in which the defendant may, with
luck, be placed on probation after a first offense but will likely be far
more severely punished for a second infraction.
This departure is probably due, in large part, to the almost over-
whelming sentiment in favor of keeping the family intact. This is espe-
cially true when reports of child abuse come to the primary attention of
social welfare agencies or juvenile courts rather than law enforcement
authorities. The former are more likely to feel that prosecution is unwise
or unnecessary if the problem can be solved in other ways. Studies have
shown that decisions not to prosecute are made in a number of cases, 70
due either to a preference for maintaining the family unit or the difficulty
of obtaining a conviction. Additionally, if prosecution is unsuccessful,
the child may remain with parents who feel justified in continuing abuse,
and the publicity that attends the prosecution may make it more diffi-
cult to work with the parents.71
Pittsburgh, two died in the hospital and five others died after release under suspicious
circumstances. Kempe surveyed 71 hospitals which reported 302 cases of abuse in one year
in which 33 children died. He further found that 77 district attorneys had knowledge of a
total of 447 cases in a year in which 45 children died. A study of child abuse in Iowa
covering 71 children found that seven died of their injuries. Gillespie's study of 19 burned
children reported a far higher mortality rate. Six of the children died of injuries existing
at the same time as the burns and another died after being returned to his family. It is
possible that the difference is due to the nature of the injuries suffered.
69. Elmer, supra note 7, at 183; Kempe, supra note 7, at 17.
Kempe's survey of hospitals and district attorneys found that 85 of the 279 surviving
children seen by hospitals suffered permanent brain injury and that 29 of the 402 surviving
cases known to district attorneys resulted in similar permanent damage to the child. Elmer
reported that three of the 43 surviving children studied were permanently crippled by their
injuries and that four more showed serious physical defects when next seen at the hospital.
Four other children were seriously mentally retarded, although it was unknown whether the
retardation preceded or resulted from the injuries.
70. Cameron, supra note 7, at 18; Kempe, supra note 7, at 17.
Kempe found that prosecution was undertaken in only a third of the cases reported
by hospitals and in 46% of those known to the district attorneys. Cameron reported that
legal action was taken against the father in 34% of the cases and against the mother in 21%.
71. Rubin, supra note 37, at 234.
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Contrary positions can easily be taken on this matter. There are
those who would argue that deterrent value of criminal sanctions and
the fact that in no other area of criminal law is simple emotional instabil-
ity a defense. If the battering parent is clearly insane by whatever rule
a given jurisdiction has adopted, there is no problem, but it is doubtful
that this is true in any substantial number of cases. Further, emotional
instability is still not a defense to child abuse but often simply results
in a decision not to prosecute in situations where it is thought that
temporary removal of the child from the home or social casework will
provide a solution. Ultimately, in a majority of cases this refusal to
prosecute has the same effect as providing a defense. Perhaps the saddest
commentary on this situation is the fact that, while prosecutions for
child abuse are relatively rare as compared to incidence, prosecutions
for murder or manslaughter are increasingly common. The tragedy of
this is accentuated by the fact that a number of these children who were
battered to death had been abused previously."2 It is only fair to note,
however, that convictions in child abuse cases may be difficult to obtain
because of the nature of the offense. Not only are physicians often re-
luctant to testify in criminal proceedings, but abuse is commonly com-
mitted in the privacy of the home with no one except possibly the
abuser's spouse knowing the circumstances of the child's injury. The
child is usually too young or too frightened to tell the story, and if the
husband-wife privilege is not abrogated by statute, evidence is likely to
be wholly circumstantial absent a confession. The difficulty of showing
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt becomes obvious in these cases. More-
over, a jury may have the same trouble believing that an adult would
severely injure a defenseless child as physicians do.
In most cases it is far more helpful to bring proceedings on
behalf of the children in juvenile court than to prosecute a
parent in a criminal action. Not only are criminal charges in
child abuse cases difficult to prove, but punishing the parent
does not help to change his behavior, nor do threats of punish-
ment seem to deter him from further acts of abuse.7
3
The opposing view of the punishment problem stresses the primary
interest in the welfare of the child. It is undisputed that imprison-
ment of the battering parent will not heal the child's injuries or
negate the retardation that may be attributed to them. If the premise
of serving the best interests of the child can be accepted as a guideline
for all problems raised by an abuse situation, the argument against
punishment may be quite strong in many cases. If preservation of the
family unit is considered to be of paramount importance, as it is by a
72. Cameron found that 90% of the children who died had suffered previous abuse.
Cameron, supra note 7, at 11.
73. Rubin, supra note 37, at 234.
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number of authorities, more weight is added to the case against punish-
ment. There is no question but that this is an extremely modern means
of attempting to deal with a problem that is largely criminal in nature.
Rehabilitation has long been accepted as a primary consideration in
criminal cases and an elaborate probation system has evolved as one
means of dealing with this problem, but seldom has the rehabilitative
process been left solely to actual social casework with no participation
by the criminal courts. The impact of this innovation can be realized
more fully when it is considered that most criminals have some kind of
emotional or psychiatric problems which lead them to allow their be-
havior to deviate from the boundaries set by society. In cases involving
the better known criminal offenses, rehabilitation is often attempted
largely within a punitive framework. Emotional or psychiatric problems
are then dealt with within that setting. Imprisonment of a parent,
whether for shoplifting, larceny or child abuse, will have at least some
disruptive effect on the family, and while extensive counseling might be
sufficient to prevent further offenses in any of these situations, it is not
generally considered as a sole answer in the first two. Why should a
young parent who fractures his child's skull be treated any differently
than a young parent who steals a television set? The only answer is
that, if enlightened, socially-oriented methods of rehabilitation are ac-
cepted, they should be extended to cover other crimes. The more modern
provisions for rehabilitation of battering parents should not be con-
demned if results are achieved which would be comparable to those of
a prison. The advantages are numerous: reduced cost to the state, main-
tenance of the family, and very possibly a solution to the battering
parent's underlying problem which contributed to or brought about the
abuse and which might possibly be difficult to solve in a prison setting
where time and individual attention are often severely limited.
B. The Social Casework Method
The social casework method of dealing with abusive parents com-
bines medical and sociological efforts to preserve the family unit. Its
primary objective is to protect the child and to attempt to restructure
the home to remove the element of danger to him. Ideally, it is initiated
while the child is still hospitalized. The home atmosphere and back-
grounds of the parents are scrutinized by a trained social worker.
Neighbors, relatives and others who know the parents may be inter-
viewed. The parents are interviewed at length on their attitudes toward
the child, each other, their home, and other pertinent subjects. While
premature or hostile accusations of child abuse may be detrimental to
all concerned and may retard efforts to learn of the reason for the child's
injuries,74 these interviews may bring the first admissions of abuse from
74. Elmer, Hazards in Determining Child Abuse, 45 CHMLD WELFARE 28 (1966).
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parents who have previously denied all responsibility for the child's
condition. Along with the admission is likely to come a flood of reasons
or explanations for the abuse that may lead to the heart of the problem.
The social worker may then attempt to help the abusive parent deal with
the problem effectively, providing the moral support that often makes
the difference between success and failure. In some cases, showing the
young and harried mother how to care for her child properly or helping
her set up a workable routine may enable her to cope with day to day
difficulties that might previously have resulted in abuse to a child who
cried at the wrong time. In other cases, the parent may be a victim of
community exclusion, deeply in need of inclusion to break the battering
cycle."5 Helping him to readjust and to seek inclusion in acceptable
ways may relieve the frustration that was previously taken out on the
child. If psychiatric problems are presented, counseling may be arranged.
Oftentimes, however, the greatest need of the parent is an understanding
friend who can be relied on for help and moral support. Once a relation-
ship of trust is established, the social worker may be able to allay
the parents' fears about themselves and their often imagined inade-
quacies.
Upon the release of the child from the hospital, a decision must
be made whether to let him return to the home. "Under no circumstances
should such a child be returned to his original environment until after
definite proof of its improvement has been given."76 If it is felt that
the home atmosphere is still dangerous for the child, a petition may be
made to the juvenile court to remove the child from the home tempo-
rarily. Such a temporary removal would be for an indefinite period of
time and would be terminated only when the home is found to be safe for
the child. In the meantime, the child would be placed in a foster home
under the supervision and custody of the juvenile court. If the home
were considered reasonably free from danger, the child would be re-
turned to his parents.
After the child's return to the home, social casework continues to
make sure that the adaptive process continues. The parent who seems to
recognize, understand and be able to cope with his problems while the
child is hospitalized may be subject to relapses in time of stress. Prevent-
ing this stress may be impossible, but providing the parent with the
means to cope with it may save the child from further abuse. With a
parent who has a basic and genuine underlying interest in and love for
the child, help in understanding the situations and crises which lead to
abuse of the child may help him to recognize the danger they present
and to attempt to control his impulses more effectively.
Periodic visits from a trained nurse constitute another segment of
the over-all casework. The nurse can easily examine the child to see if
75. Wasserman, supra note 22, at 179.
76. Barta, supra note 9, at 553.
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subsequent traumatic episodes have occurred. While gross instances of
abuse might be readily visible to the social worker, a nurse is able to
detect subtle indications of trauma and to determine if these are consis-
tent with the normal bumps and bruises suffered by an active child.
The fact that a medically oriented investigator will call periodically
may also have a sobering effect on the parents in times of stress. Know-
ing that their misdeeds are more likely to be discovered, they may exert
a greater degree of self-control.
Over a period of time, need for the periodic visits of both the nurse
and social worker diminish. Having become more able to control them-
selves and having a better understanding of their problems, the parents
are less likely to strike out at the child. As the child becomes older, he
outgrows the characteristics which make him prone to abuse. As he learns
to talk, the parents realize that it is then impossible to continue battering
him without this coming to the attention of others. There may, of course,
still be moments of discipline which some authorities might regard as
harsh, but discipline, within reasonable limits, is a matter of parental
discretion and, if within these limits, should not be construed as abuse
simply because the parent had battered the child previously. It is also pos-
sible that the passage of time will bring maturity and responsibility to
young parents and enable them to cope more successfully with the adult
world that they were not previously prepared to enter.
Of course there are instances when social casework will be to no
avail. In some cases, the child will be truly unwanted. In others, the
parent's problems will be too great to be solved without long-range
psychiatric treatment and possibly hospitalization or institutionalization.
"In families where a mentally ill parent is physically abusing a child,
the mental illness soon becomes so apparent and predictable that sep-
aration of abusive parent and child is imperative. 7 7 In still others, the
parents will be unwilling to cooperate with the caseworker or refuse
to accept help. In these cases, a number of solutions are possible. Some-
times the non-abusive parent leaves the abuser and takes the child.
Divorce may follow in some cases and there is little doubt that the court
will consider the abusive parent unfit to have custody of the child. The
problem here is that, in separation cases, the abusive parent may beg
for the return of the spouse and child, asking forgiveness and promising
not to repeat the abuse. These promises are sometimes forgotten after
the return and further injuries are inflicted on the child. In these situa-
tions, the caseworker must be alert to the possible results of the return
and recommend removal of the child from the home if it cannot otherwise
be protected.
Little difficulty is encountered in cases where the child is obviously
unwanted or both parents have severe emotional or psychiatric problems.
In such a situation the child should seldom if ever be returned to the
77. Delsordo, supra note 3, at 213.
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family following hospitalization. Where the child is unwanted, the
parents are likely to have little objection to its placement in a foster
home. However, some seriously disturbed parents may have a strong
desire to have the child returned to them. One writer has stated that
"where parents are unable to admit their abusive attacks on children
and where there is definite evidence of assaultive behavior (fractures,
subdural hematoma, etc.), we should be predisposed to seek removal
of the child from the home immediately to prevent further damage.""
With this evidence and a critical report by the social worker, the juvenile
court should give serious consideration to a petition for removal. If in
doubt, there seems to be no reason why the court could not order psychi-
atric evaluation of the parents before returning the child to them, using
the results of the evaluation along with other information in making a
decision. Removal of the child from his family is a serious matter, and
studies seem to indicate that this course is not taken in most situations. 9
While mistakes in judgment may be made, failure of the court to order
removal should not be seen as a condemnation of the social casework
effort.
In still other instances, the battered child may be close to outgrow-
ing his period of vulnerability at the time of the attack which resulted
in his hospitalization. In these cases, the social worker may see the child
through what remains of his period of greatest danger and then consider
the problem solved. If no siblings have been born in the meantime, it is
possible that a solution actually has been achieved. However, the birth
of a sibling may simply shift the problem to the younger child. In such a
situation, it is important for the social worker and visiting nurse to
check the new baby's progress to guard against a simple transfer of the
abuse. If both children progress satisfactorily, the need to visit may
lessen over a period of time. It may seem that seeing each child through
his infancy is a somewhat ambitious program simply because one child
has been abused. However, saving a child from severe injuries and main-
taining the family intact are objectives worthy of this effort. "Preventing
neglect and battering depends in the long run on preventing transmission
of the kind of social deprivation which takes children's lives, damages
their physical health, and retards their minds, and which contributes
through those who survive to a rising population of next generation
parents who will not be able to nurture children."8 0
78. Merrill, supra note 7, at 13.
79. Merrill, supra note 7, at 6-7; Comment, The Child Abuse Problem in Iowa, J. IOWA
MaD. Soc'Y, supra note 7, at 692.
Merrill found that court action was initiated to remove the child from the home in only
8% of the cases studied, while structural family change occurred in 26% and the family
remained intact and received casework treatment in the remaining cases. The Iowa study
reported that 17 of the 64 children studied who survived the abuse inflicted were removed
from their parents by court action, although the attempt was made to improve conditions
so that the child could remain with the family wherever possible.
80. Morris, supra note 29, at 60.
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IV. THE LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE
Alerted by a growing amount of information and sentiment, the
legislatures of all fifty states, the District of Columbia and the Virgin
Islands have acted to meet the problem."' It was apparent to them that
statutes prohibiting abuse were insufficient and that the true extent of
the problem was largely unknown.82 Until instances of child abuse came
to the attention of the authorities, it was evident that little could be done
either to protect the children involved or to deal with the perpetrators of
the abuse.
The solution was found in reporting statutes, similar to those
enacted for cases of gunshot wounds. The first state to pass such legis-
lation was California in 1963, and its lead was quickly followed. Support
for such bills was almost universal and disagreement among members
of different parties was largely restricted to who would receive credit
for them or whose wording would be used. Committees were formed
in a number of states to investigate the problem and formulate the legis-
lation. These committees were often broad-based and included busi-
nessmen, civic leaders and others whose concerns were not primarily
political.13 Unfortunately, for all the fervor that existed, the results often
did not meet the needs. This was due, no doubt, in part to a lack of
certainty as to just what the needs were. While these hastily enacted
statutes have supplied a starting point, it is clear that a number of them
are in need of revision to reflect the lessons learned over the last five
years.
A. The Purpose Clause
A number of the statutes enacted start with purpose clauses. These
are advantageous for the obvious reason that the court is given direction
in statutory construction should this be needed. While legislative history
is available in some states, it is not in others. A purpose clause would be
far more necessary in these latter states, but certainly nothing is lost
by including such a clause in other states. The purpose clause further
defines the aims of the various statutes and some indicate what action
should be taken. Ten states84 limit this clause to the aim of the legisla-
81. Both the District of Columbia and the Virgin Islands will be treated as states for
statistical purposes.
82. In the first nine months of 1962, newspapers reported 378 cases of abuse involving
446 children and 109 fatalities in 47 states. It seems obvious that these cases are only a small
minority as newspapers would be unlikely to know of or report the less serious cases or cases
which were not extraordinary. Jacobziner, discussing Fontana, The Neglect and Abuse of
Children, 64 N.Y.S.J. oF MED. 215, 221 (1964).
83. Paulsen, Parker & Adelman, Child Abuse Reporting Laws-Some Legislative History,
34 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 482 (1966).
84. [Statutes will be cited according to the date of passage.] DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16,
§ 1001 (1965); IOWA CODE ANN. § 235A.1 (1965) ; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-716 (1965); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 626.554(1) (1967); MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 10-901 (1965); NEv. REV. STAT.
§ 200.501 (1965) ; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 571:25 (1965) ; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6-8.1 (1964);
OKRA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 845 (1966); W. VA. CODE § 49-6A-1 (1965).
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tion, generally stating that it is for the protection of children who have
had injuries inflicted on them. Six statess, add a somewhat limited aim
of stating an intent that protective services of the state be used to pro-
tect the child's welfare and prevent further abuse. The clauses from
the statutes in these states are similar to the provision of the Model Act
recommended by the Children's Division of the U.S. Department of
Health, Education and Welfare."0 While the intent is no doubt laudatory,
it is thought that somewhat stronger and more definite language might
be desirable. This objection is largely overcome by the language used in
ten states which provides that protective services shall be made available
to prevent further abuse, enhance the welfare of the child and preserve
the family wherever possible. 7 It is obvious that such a clause gives
85. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 42-801 (1965); IND. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 1419 (1965) ; KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 199. 335(1) (1966) ; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, ch. 26, § 1351 (1965) ; WASH. REV.
CODE AxN. § 26.44.010 (1965); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 171.
86. The Model Act is as follows:
1. PURPOSE
The purpose of this Act is to provide for the protection of children who have had
physical injury inflicted upon them and who are further threatened by the conduct
of those responsible for their care and protection. Physicians who become aware of
such cases should report them to appropriate police authority thereby causing
the protective services of the State to be brought to bear in an effort to protect the
health and welfare of these children and to prevent further abuses.
2. REPORTS BY PHYSICIANS AND INSTITUTIONS
Any physician, including any licensed doctor of medicine, licensed osteopathic
physician, intern and resident, having reasonable cause to suspect that [a] child
under the age of - (the maximum age of juvenile court jurisdiction) brought
to him or coming before him for examination, care or treatment has had serious
physical injury or injuries inflicted upon him other than by accidental means by a
parent or other person responsible for his care, shall report or cause reports to be
made in accordance with the provisions of this Act; provided that when the
attendance of a physician with respect to a child is pursuant to the performance
of services as a member of the staff of a hospital or similar institution he shall notify
the person in charge of the institution or his designated delegate who shall report
or cause reports to be made in accordance with the provisions of this Act.
3. NATURE AND CONTENT OF REPORT; TO WHOM MADE
An oral report shall be made immediately by telephone or otherwise, and followed
as soon thereafter as possible by a report in writing, to an appropriate police au-
thority. Such reports shall contain the names and addresses of the child and his
parents or other persons responsible for his care, if known, the child's age, the nature
and extent of the child's injuries (including any evidence of previous injuries), and
any other information that the physician believes might be helpful in establishing
the cause of the injuries and the identity of the perpetrator.
4. IMMUNITY FROM LIABILITY
Anyone participating in good faith in the making of a report pursuant to this Act
shall have immunity from any liability, civil or criminal, that might otherwise be
incurred or imposed. Any such participant shall have the same immunity with respect
to participation in any judicial proceeding resulting from such report.
5. EVIDENCE NOT PRIVILEGED
Neither the physician-patient privilege nor the husband-wife privilege shall be a
ground for excluding evidence regarding a child's injuries or the cause thereof, in
any judicial proceeding resulting from a report pursuant to this Act.
6. PENALTY FOR VIOLATION
Anyone knowingly and willfully violating the provisions of this Act shall be guilty
of a misdemeanor.
U.S. DEPT. H.E.W., THE ABUSED CHEID (1965).
87. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-13-1 (1963); D.C. CODE tit. 2, § 2-161 (1966); FLA.
STAT. § 828.041(1) (1965); GA. CODE ANN. § 74-111(d) (1965); SEsS. LAWS OF HAWAir,
Act 261 § 1 (1967); IDAHO CODE § 16-1624 (1965); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 3851
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more direction to those concerned with implementation of the statute.
This language seems to imply that protective services will be established
to deal with the problem if they do not already exist, rather than simply
stating, as the Children's Division proposal seems to do, that those which
exist be made available to deal with the problem. It further states as an
objective the preservation of the family, and this may be interpreted
as recommending that social casework be used if possible rather than
punishment. The statutes of 11 states8 8 contain no purpose clause, and
the remainder espouses an intent regarding a variety of other problems,
many of which are covered in the body of statutes in other states.
In this context it should be noted that a direction to make protec-
tive services available is by no means a panacea. While these statements
sound commendable, the fact remains that if such services do not exist
at the time of passage of the statute, they must be established, and this
requires money. While some states have directed that services be made
available, they have neglected to appropriate the necessary funds, thus
emasculating the provision. In only two states have funds actually been
appropriated;8 this seems to be an exceptionally poor record, even
granting that the agencies may already exist in some states. It is impera-
tive that statutory provision be made for the investigation of reports of
child abuse and funds should be appropriated to carry them out, 0 for it is
doubtless true that "no law can be better than its implementation, and
its implementation can be no better than its resources permit.")
91
B. Making the Report
The next clause generally deals with who is required to report and
under what conditions. There is great dissimilarity among the states on
this matter, almost every one having inserted its own special provisions.
The situation is further complicated by the fact that some states have
enacted permissive rather than mandatory legislation. While permissive
statutes, generally allowing a physician to report if he pleases, are better
than none at all, it is questionable whether they are very much better.
It seems in these cases that the aim is more to protect the physician than
the child. Such statutes allow physicians to make a medical judgment
their first concern rather than the social policy. 2 Even with a manda-
(1965); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-9-12 (1965); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40-13.1-1 (1965); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 55-16-1 (1965).
88. ALA. CODE tit. 27, ch. 4, §§ 21-25 (1965) ; Aiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-842.01 (1965)
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-38a (1965); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:403 (1964); Micir.
COMPLED LAWS ANN. § 722.571 (1968); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 210.105 (1965); N.Y. PEN. CODE
§ 483-d (1964); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4330 (1965); S.C. CODE § 20-302 (1965); S.D.
SESSION LAWS OF 1964, ch. 90; TEx. CIv. STAT. art. 695c-2 (1965).
89. DeFrancis, supra note 42, at 21.
90. Paulsen, Legal Protections Against Child Abuse, 13 CHmoRN 46 (1966).
91. Paulsen, Child Abuse Reporting Laws: The Shape of the Legislation, 67 CoLUx.
L. REv. 1, 49 (1967).
92. Paulsen states that "[wihether cases of suspected abuse should be brought to the
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tory statute, the physician would still have to make a medical judgment,
but subordination to social policy would not occur.13 Further, the argu-
ment has been made that existence of a mandatory statute may make
parents hesitate to seek medical treatment for abused children until
they realize that the child is seriously injured or fear impending death. 4
In some cases, abused children brought to hospitals have been dead for
hours."5 In at least one reported instance, a mother stated that she de-
layed taking her child to a physician for fear of having his injuries re-
ported. The two-and-a-half-year-old child subsequently died. 96 However,
there is no assurance that the same problem would not exist with a per-
missive statute, and the parent is less apt to be resentful if the statute
requires a report. 7 Additionally, permissive reporting is almost certain to
produce statistical distortion, gaps and inaccuracies.9 " "To make the
law permissive emasculates its intent and purpose. It results only in suit-
ing the convenience of the reporting source and, too often, may fail to
bring protection to children in grave hazard."99 Permissive statutes have
been enacted in six states,100 and it is interesting to note that two'0 ' of
these statutes contain no purpose clause, whereas better than four out of
five mandatory statutes contain purpose clauses. The fact remains that
society's interest should be primarily that of protecting the child in
these cases and that permissive statutes are likely to fail miserably in this
regard.
1. MANDATORY REPORTERS
Reporting by physicians is permitted or required by all the statutes,
although 36 states provide that if a physician attends a child while per-
forming his duties as a staff member of a hospital that he must notify the
person in charge of the hospital or a designated delegate of such a person
who is then required to make the report. 02 Six states limit coverage to
attention of the authorities responsible for child protection is not a medical question, but a
question of social policy, properly answered by a legislature." Paulsen, supra note 91, at 47.
93. Paulsen, supra note 91, at 8.
94. Cameron, supra note 7, at 3; Fontana, supra note 6, at 1390; Paulsen, supra note
91, at 9.
95. Cameron, supra note 7, at 3.
96. People v. Forbs, 62 Cal. 2d 847, 402 P.2d 825, 44 Cal. Rptr. 753 (1965).
97. Paulsen, supra note 91, at 8-9.
98. Id. at 8.
99. DeFrancis, supra note 42, at 21.
100. ALASKA STAT. §§ 11.67.010 to .070 (1965); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 210.105 (1965);
N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-9-13 (1965); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-318.2 (1965); TEX. Civ. STAT. art.
695c-2 (1965); WASH. REV. CODE ArN. §§ 26.44.030 (1965).
101. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 210.105 (1965) ; TEX. CIv. STAT. Art. 695c-2 (1965).
102. ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13.842.01(A) (1965); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 42-802 (1965);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-38a(a) (1965); DEL. CODE AN. tit. 16, § 1002 (1965); D.C.
CODE tit. 2, § 2-162 (1966); FLA. STAT. § 828.041(2) (1965); GA. CODE ANN. § 74-111(a)
(1965) ; SESS. LAWS OF HAWAI, Act 261 § 2 (1967) ; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, § 2042 (1965) ;
IND. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 1420 (1965); IOWA CODE ANN. § 235A.3 (1965); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 38-717 (1965); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 199.335(2) (1966); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 14:403(B) (1964); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 3852 (1965); MD. ANN. CODE, art. 27,
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"any physician"'01 (two of them permissively'0 4), and one"0 5 requires re-
porting by "every physician." The remainder include at least one other
person or institution and oftentimes a substantial number of others.
Osteopaths are required to report in 25 states,0 6 and permitted to report
in one.'0 7 Dentists are covered in 14 states; s08 social or welfare workers
in 13; 1 chiropractors in ten;" 0° school teachers in ten;"' and pharma-
cists or druggists in four." 2 Ten statutes"' include nurses in any capac-
§ 11A(c) (1963); MICH. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 722.571(1) (1968); Miss. CODE ANN.
§ 7185-05 (1966); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 210.105.1 (1965); MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 10-902
(1965); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.502 (1965); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 571:26 (1965); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 9:6-8.3 (1964); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-9-13 (1965); OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.421
(1966) ; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 846 (1966) ; ORs. REV. STAT. § 146.750(1) (1965) ; R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 40-13.1-3(2) (1965); S.D. SESS. LAWS OP 1964, ch. 90; UTAH CODE ANN. § 55-16-2
(1965) ; V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 172 (1966) ; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, ch. 26, § 1352 (1965) ;
VA. CODE § 16.1-217.1 (1968); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.44.030(2) (1965); W. VA.
CODE § 49-6A-2 (1965) ; WYO. STAT. § 14-28.1 (1963).
103. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13.842.01(A) (1965); D.C. CODE tit. 2, § 2-162 (1966);
MICH. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 722.571(1) (1968); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 210.105.1 (1965);
ORE. REV. STAT. § 146.750(1) (1965) ; TEX. CIV. STAT. art. 695c-2 (1965).
104. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 210.105.1 (1965) ; TEX. CIV. STAT. art. 695c-2 (1965).
105. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 119, § 39A (1964).
106. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 42-802 (1965); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-13-2 (1963); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 1002 (1965) ; FLA. STAT. § 828.041(2) (1965) ; GA. CODE ANN. § 74-111(a)
(1965); SESS. LAWS OF HAWAII, Act. 261 § 2 (1967); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, § 2042 (1965) ;
IND. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 1420 (1965); IOWA CODE ANN. § 235A.2 (1965) ; KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 38-717 (1965) ; KY. REV. STAT. ANNj. § 199.335(2) (1966) ; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:403(A)
(1964); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 3852 (1965); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.502(a) (1965);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 571:26 (1965); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6-8.3 (1964); N.Y. PEN. CODE
§ 483-d (1964); N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-25-01 (1965); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 846 (1966);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4330 (1965); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40-13.1-2(1) (1965); S.D. SESS.
LAWS OF 1964, ch. 90; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, ch. 26, § 1852 (1965) ; V.I. CODE ANN. tit.
19, § 172 (1966); WYO. STAT. § 14-28.1 (1963).
107. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.44.030 (1965).
108. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 42-802 (1965); CALIF. PEN. CODE § 11161.5 (West 1963);
SESS. LAWS OF HAWAII, ACT 261 § 2 (1967); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, § 2042 (1965);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 235.A2 (1965); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-717 (1965); MD. ANN. CODE art.
27, § 11A(b)1 (1963); Miss. CODE ANN. § 7185-05 (1966); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.502(a)
(1965); N.Y. PFN. CODE § 483-d (McKinney 1964); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 846 (1966);
S.D. SESS. LAWS OF 1964, ch. 90; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.44.020(3) (1965); WIS.
STAT. ANN. § 48.981(1) (1965).
109. ALA. CODE tit. 27, ch. 4, § 21 (1965); ALAS. STAT. § 11.67.010(b) (1965); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-38a(a) (1965); GA. CODE ANN. § 74-111(a) (1965); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 38-717 (1965); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 11A(c) (1963); MONT. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 10-902 (1965); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.502(d) (1965); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-9-13 (1965);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-318.2 (1965); Omio REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.421 (1966); W. VA.
CODE § 49-6A-2 (1965); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.981(1) (1965).
110. CAL. PEN. CODE § 11161.5 (West 1963); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, § 2042 (1965);
IND. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 1420 (1965); IOWA CODE ANN. § 235A.2 (1965); KAN. STAT.
ANN. 38-717 (1965); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 3852 (1965); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 50-25-01 (1965); S.D. SESS. LAWS OF 1964, ch. 90; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, ch. 26, § 1352
(1966); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.44.020(3) (1965).
111. ALA. CODE tit. 27, ch. 4, § 21 (1965); ALAS. STAT. § 11.67.010(b) (1965); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-38a(a) (1965); MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 10-902 (1965); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 200.502(d) (1965); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-9-13 (1965); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-318.2
(1965); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.421 (1966); ORE. REV. STAT. § 146.750(3) (1965);
W. VA. CODE § 49-6A-2 (1965).
112. ALA. CODE tit. 27, ch. 4, § 21 (1965); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 42-802 (1965); Mum.
STAT. ANN. § 626.554(2) (1967) ; Wyo. STAT. § 14-28.1 (1963).
113. ALA. CODE tit. 27, ch. 4, § 22 (1965); ALAS. STAT. § 11.67.010(a) (1967); ARK.
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ity or in a number of capacities, and five 14 more require reporting by
a nurse only if attending a child in the absence of a health practitioner.
Eight states"' qualify the types of nurses required to report, limiting
coverage to registered, visiting or public health nurses. Seven states"
specifically include surgeons as well as physicians, although this would
seem to be redundant as surgeons are just specialized physicians. Other
medical personnel, such as interns,117 residents, 118 laboratory techni-
cians," 9 podiatrists,' 20 optometrists,' 2 ' hospital staff members,' 22 U.S.
medical officers on duty in the state,2 3 superintendents or managers of
various medical institutions 24 and others authorized to engage in the
practice of healing1 5 are covered in the statutes of as many as five
states. Hospitals are included in two states, 26 one of which further in-
cludes clinics and sanatoriums.127 Four states 2 " go so far as to require
reports from "any person" or "any other person," but one 29 limits
this to those called on to render aid or medical assistance. Five states' 0
STAT. ANN. § 42-802 (1965); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.554(2) (1965); MONT. REV. CODE
ANN. § 10-902 (1965); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-318.2 (1965); ORE. REV. STAT. § 146.750(13)
(1965); VA. CODE § 16.1-217.1 (1968); WiS. STAT. ANN. § 48.981(1) (1965); WYO. STAT.
§ 14-28.1 (1963).
114. IOWA CODE ANN. § 235A.2 (1965); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-717 (1965); Mo. ANN.
CODE art. 27, § 11A(b)l (1963); NEv. REv. STAT. § 200.502(c) (1965); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 21, § 846 (1966).
115. Georgia and North Dakota require public health nurses to report. GA. CODE
ANN. § 74-111(a) (1965); N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-25-01 (1965). The Connecticut, Hawaii
and Mississippi statutes cover only registered nurses in this category, and the statutes of
New Mexico, Ohio and West Virginia cover both registered and visiting nurses. CoNN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. tit. 17-38a(a) (1965) ; SEss. LAWS OF HAWAII, Act 261 § 2 (1967); Miss. CODE
ANN. 7185-05 (1966) ; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-9-13 (1965) ; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.421
(1966); W. VA. CODE § 49-6A-2 (1965).
116. ALA. CODE tit. 27, ch. 4, § 21 (1965) ; CALIF. PEN. CODE § 11161.5 (West 1963)
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-38a(a) (1965); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, § 2042 (1965); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 235A.2 (1965); S.D. SEss. LAWS OF 1964, ch. 90; WIs. STAT. ANN. § 48.981(1)
(1965).
117. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 42-802 (1965); FLA. STAT. § 828.041(2) (1963).
118. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 42-802 (1965) ; FLA. STAT. § 828.041(2) (1963).
119. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 42-802 (1965); WYO. STAT. § 14-28.1 (1963).
120. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, § 2042 (1965) ; IOWA CODE ANN. § 235A.3 (1965).
121. IOWA CODE ANN. § 235A.2 (1965).
122. S.C. CODE § 20-302.1 (1965).
123. S.C. CODE § 20-302.1 (1965).
124. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 42-802 (1965); N.Y. PEN. CODE § 483-d (McKinney 1964);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4330 (1965); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.981(1) (1965).
125. SEss. LAWS OF HAWAII, Act 261 § 2 (1967); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 11A(c)
(1963); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.554(2) (1967); VA. CODE § 16.1-217.1 (1968); W. VA.
CODE § 49-6A-2 (1965).
126. ALA. CODE tit. 27, d. 4, § 21 (1965) ; IDAHO CODE § 16-1641 (1965).
127. ALA. CODE tit. 27, ch. 4, § 21 (1965).
128. ALA. CODE tit. 27, ch. 4, § 21 (1965); Nan. REv. STAT. § 28-481 (1965); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 37-1202 (1966); UTAH CODE ANN. § 55-16-2 (1965).
Iowa and Maryland specifically permit but do not require reporting by any other person.
IOWA CODE ANm . § 235A.3 (1965); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 11A(d) (1963).
129. AL.A. CODE tit. 27, d. 4, § 21 (1965).
130. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-38a(a) (1965); SESS. LAWS OF HAWArI, ACT 261 § 2
(1967); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 11A(c) (1963); NEv. REV. STAT. § 200.502(d) (1965);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-318.2 (1965).
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include school authorities, and four"' cover religious personnel although
one' 32 limits this to Christian Science practitioners. Another l3 covers
only ordained ministers of established churches. Coroners"3 are included
in the 'statutes of two states, and attorneys,'" social workers,"36 and
mental health workers" 7 are each required to report by one state. Law
enforcement officers are covered in four states." 8 Seven states"19 provide
that those who are required to report need do so only when acting in
an official capacity.
These provisions specifying who shall report are especially interest-
ing considering the current debate in the literature regarding whether
mandatory reporting statutes should be confined to physicians and insti-
tutions. Those favoring restriction cite the fact that a physician, by
virtue of his special training, is in a far better position to make a
diagnosis and determine whether the injuries suffered are consistent
with abuse. Nurses are excluded on this basis because they are con-
sidered unqualified to form an opinion as to how the injury occurred.
One authority who favors limiting required reporting to physicians has
explained his position by stating:
The physician more than any other individual is able to deter-
mine whether the child's injuries are consistent with the
parent's recital of a history of non-traumatic events or of minor
"accidental" injuries. It is the physician who is best able to dis-
cover the evidence of multiple injuries in various stages of
healing which have come to be recognized as "signs" of the
battered child syndrome. Indeed, the very fact that the medical
profession has seen fit to describe the problem as the battered
child syndrome, or the "maltreatment syndrome" and to empha-
size the role of the medical practitioner in its detection may ex-
plain why legislators have looked to the medical profession
as the class most likely to make disclosures of child abuse. 4'
Some of the writers who support this position add, however, that the
statute does not prohibit reporting by others' 4' but simply does not
make it mandatory. A 1960 study, prior to the enactment of any reporting
131. CALia. PEN. CODE § 11161.5 (West 1963); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, § 2042 (1965);
NEv. REV. STAT. § 200.502(d) (1965); N.M. STAT. Arr. § 13-9-13 (1965).
132. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, § 2042 (1965).
133. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-9-13 (1965).
134. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 42-802 (1965); SESs. LAWS OF HAWAII, Act 261 (1967).
135. NEv. REv. STAT. § 200.502(d) (1965).
136. SESS. LAWS OF HAWAII, Act 261 § 2 (1967).
137. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 11A(c) (1963).
138. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 11A(c) (1963); MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 14.564(l) (1965);
ORE. REv. STAT. § 146.750(3) (1965); S.D. Szss. LAWS OF 1964, ch. 90.
139. SESS. LAWS OF HAWAII, ACT 261 § 2 (1967); MONT. REv. CODE ANN. § 10-902
(1965); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-9-13 (1965); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-318.2 (1965); OHIo REV.
CODE ANN. § 2151.421 (1966); VA. CODE § 16.1-217.1 (1966); W. VA. CODE § 49-6A-2 (1965).
140. McCoid, supra note 37, at 28.
141. Id.; Comment, Legislation as Protection for the Battered Child, 12 ViLL. L. REv.
313 (1967).
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statutes, seems to point up the necessity of requiring medical personnel
to report. Of 180 children who were abused within 155 families, it noted
that 24%7o of the referrals on these cases came from relatives, 23% from
legal authorities and 22o from neighbors. Physicians and hospitals ac-
counted for only 9% of the reports although they had had contact with
30o of the cases.' 42 This would seem to indicate that those other than
physicians will report without a statute but that the medical profession
needs at least a little prodding.'4 3 The American Humane Association has
recommended that mandatory statutes be directed at physicians and
hospital personnel,"' and the Model Act includes only physicians, osteo-
paths, interns and residents. The position taken by those who favor re-
stricted legislation is aptly summed up by Professor Monrad Paulsen of
Columbia:
The case for confining mandatory reporting to physicians is a
strong one. The mandate speaks to the problems which doctors
face in particular and which are likely to inhibit reporting. The
rest of us are not bound by similar concerns about professional
responsibility. However, some of us might fail to speak for fear
of facing a successful tort action based on libel, slander, or an
invasion of the right to privacy. Therefore, there is much to
commend a scheme which requires physicians to report, but
clothes every reporter who acts in good faith with immunity
from civil and criminal liability.'4 5
Those who favor broader coverage sometimes cite the fact that an
abused child might not be taken to a physician or hospital. 4 ' Even
Professor Paulsen admits that existence of a statute requiring physi-
cians and institutions to report may deter parents from seeking treatment
142. Merrill, supra note 7, at 3.
143. The American Humane Association proposal was limited to physicians as it was felt
that they were the ones who had failed to report in the past. Merrill, supra note 7, at 3-4.
144. The American Humane Association has made the following proposals for mandatory
reporting of cases of child abuse.
1. That such legislation be directed to medical practitioners and hospital personnel
coming in contact with children for the purpose of examination and treatment of
injuries sustained allegedly from accidental or other cause.
2. That doctors and hospital personnel have mandatory responsibility for reporting
all cases of child injury where medical diagnosis and findings are incompatible
with alleged history of how injuries were sustained and the syndrome leads to
the inference of "inflicted injuries."
3. That doctors and hospital staff members reporting cases of suspected inflicted
injuries be made immune to possible civil or criminal action for the disclosure
of matters which might be considered confidential because of the doctor-patient
relationship.
4. That all reports of cases of suspected inflicted injuries be made to the public or
voluntary Child Welfare service which carries the Child Protective function in the
community.
CHILDREN'S DIVISION, THE AMERICAN HUMANE Ass'N, To PROTECT THE BATTERED CHILD.
145. Paulsen, supra note 91, at 7-8.
146. McCoid, supra note 37, at 36; Legislation Notes, Privileged Communications-Abro-
gation of the Physician-Patient Privilege to Protect the Battered Child, 15 DE PAUL L. REv.
453 (1966).
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for their child, but states that the true extent of this problem is un-
known.'47 In these situations, others who come in contact with the child,
teachers, nurses and social workers in particular, would be inclined to
notice maltreatment in some circumstances. A requirement that they
report would have the effect of giving the child the protection that his
parents had denied him by their failure to have his injuries treated.
Additionally, information as to instances of child abuse might become
known to attorneys, clergy, and, to a lesser extent, some social workers
who deal primarily with adults and have little if any contact with
children. The problem of confidential communications might easily
arise if such classes of people obtained their information solely from
an abusive parent, and it is understandable that some might feel an
obligation not to disclose such matters. 4 " The same problem could also
exist with marriage counselors if included as a group required to report
as some recommend. 4 ' While there is no difficulty in stating that an
examining physician's first obligation is to the child, there is considerable
doubt as to the primary obligation of professionals having a confidential
relationship with the parents. With marriage counselors and the clergy
in particular, perhaps the duty is to the family as a whole rather than to
any individual member. While this view allows consideration of the best
interests of the family, the attempt by and desire of the parents to
solve the problem without outside intervention, and the likelihood of
future abuse, it is an entirely unsatisfactory criterion to use to determine
if a report should be required. While the solution begs the question, it
seems advisable to allow attorneys, clergy and marriage counselors to
report if they wish but avoid imposing a mandatory statutory duty on
them. This seems to be the view taken by most states at present.
While some reports from non-medical sources would no doubt
cover injuries not resulting from abuse, such a requirement pertaining
to nurses, school teachers and social workers would afford greater and
more broad-based protection to the child. No class of reporters can
guarantee complete accuracy and it has been shown that even physicians
sometimes err in deciding whether a child's injuries are due to abuse.
One study indicated that a surprising number of cases originally classified
as resulting from abuse had actually involved no maltreatment at all,
but these findings were made only after a subsequent investigation of the
explanation given by the parents." One author has further suggested
that teachers, nurses and social workers need not be covered by the
statute because they have an obligation to report due to the governmental
positions they hold. 5' However, this obligation seems to be largely un-
147. Paulsen, supra note 91, at 9.
148. Legislation Notes, supra note 146; Comment, Legislation as Protection for the Bat-
tered Child, supra note 141, at 320.
149. McCoid, supra note 37, at 29.
150. Elmer, supra note 75, at 29-30.
151. McCoid, supra note 37, at 28-29.
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written, and if it is admitted that it exists, it is difficult to see how it can
be argued that they are unqualified to report. If the obligation exists,
there should be no objection to reducing it to statutory form. Even the
American Medical Association has recommended that reporting require-
ments be extended beyond physicians and hospitals.152 This seems to in-
dicate recognition of the fact that others may be qualified to suspect abuse
and that the medical profession cannot handle the job alone. Suggested
legislation by the Medical Society of the County of New York153 would
152. Editorial, Battered Child Legislation, 188 J.A.M.A. 386 (1962).
153. The New York County Medical Society has made the following proposal for
legislation on child abuse:
REASON FOR LEGISLATION. To provide for the protection of children
whose health and welfare are adversely affected or threatened by those responsible
for their care and protection.
PARAGRAPH I-Any person who wilfully causes or permits any child to suffer
or who inflicts thereon injustifiable physical pain or mental suffering, and whoever,
having the care or custody of any child, causes or permits the life or limb of such
child to be endangered, or the health of such child to be injured, and any person
who wilfully causes or permits such child to be placed in such situations that its life
or limb may be injured, or its health likely to be injured is guilty of a misdemeanor.
PARAGRAPH II-REPORTS BY PHYSICIANS AND INSTITUTIONS.
Every person, firm or corporation conducting any hospital or pharmacy in the state,
or the managing agent thereof, or the person managing or in charge of such hospital
or pharmacy, or in charge of any ward or part of such hospital to which any child
suffering from any wound or any injury inflicted by the act of another shall report
the same immediately both by telephone and in writing to the Child Protective
Agency, The Society for Prevention of Cruelty to Children or the sheriff if such
hospital or pharmacy is located outside the incorporated limits of the city, town or
other municipal corporation. The report shall state the name of the injured person,
if known, his whereabouts, the character and extent of his injuries and the person
who inflicted such injuries, if known.
PARAGRAPH III-Every physician or surgeon, doctor of medicine including
any licensed interne or resident, and licensed osteopathic physician who has under
his charge or care any child suffering from any wounds or injury inflicted in the
manner described in Paragraph I, shall make a report of the kind specified in Para-
graph II and to the appropriate agencies named in Paragraph II.
PARAGRAPH IV-The reporting individual should submit such to the Child
Protective Agency, based on sound medical diagnosis and suspicion that the injuries
were inflicted. The following items should be considered before reporting cases of
maltreatment:
1. Characteristic age, usually under two years.
2. General health of child indicative of serious neglect.
3. Characteristic distribution of fractures.
4. Disproportionate amount of soft tissue injury.
5. Evidence that injuries occurred at different times; are in different stages of
resolution.
6. Cause of recent trauma in question.
7. Suspicious family history.
8. History of previous episodes.
9. No new lesions occurring during child's hospitalization.
PARAGRAPH V-IMMUNITY FROM LIABILITY. The reporting agent is
relieved from civil liability when making reports pursuant to the law. This immunity
from civil liability extends into every stage of the procedures up to and including
testimony presented in court relevant to the issues being tried as the direct result of
the report.
PARAGRAPH VI-EVIDENCE NOT PRIVILEGED. This physician-patient
privilege shall not be a ground for excluding evidence regarding children's injuries or
the cause thereof in any judicial procedures resulting from a report pursuant to this
Act.
PARAGRAPH VII-PENALTY FOR VIOLATION. Any person, firm or cor-
poration violating any provision of this article is guilty of a misdemeanor and is
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extend coverage beyond physicians and hospitals to "persons, firms or
corporations conducting a pharmacy," which is at least a minor advance.
Perhaps the most convincing argument in favor of extended reporting
is the fact that the legislatures of 31 states have seen fit to include at
least one group besides physicians, hospitals, osteopaths and surgeons
in their provisions. While the wisdom of legislators is sometimes subject
to question, the fact that 31 states could reject the major proposals
indicates that sentiment favors statutory guarantees of more broad-
based protection for children.
2. GROUNDS REQUIRING A REPORT
The second clause in most reporting statutes further defines the
circumstances under which a report is required. In 39 states' these
statutes order a report to be made if the reporter "has cause to believe,"
"has reasonable cause to believe," "has cause to suspect" or similar
language stating that there is evidence which supports an opinion of
abuse. Nine states' 55 provide that compliance is necessary if the reporter
"believes," "determines by medical findings," etc., that a child has been
abused. Two states... require reporting if the reporter "believes" or "has
reason to believe." While the language of the different statutes may seem
to differ only slightly, it is clear that most states take a rather objective
view and are more concerned with what could or should be derived from
the child's condition rather than what the individual reporter actually
thinks. It is obvious that this objective test offers greater protection to
the child and that a physician or other person who failed to report can-
punishable by imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding six months or by a
fine not exceeding $500, or by both.
64 N.Y.S.J. OF MED. 22 (1964).
154. ALAS. STAT. § 11.67.010 (a,b) (1965); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 42-802 (1965); COLO.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-13-3 (1963); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-38a(a) (1965); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 16, § 1002 (1965); D.C. CODE tit. 2, § 2-162 (1966); FLA. STAT. § 828.041(2)
(1965); GA. CODE ANN. § 74-111(a) (1965); SESS. LAWS OF HAWAII, Act 261 § 2 (1967);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, § 2042 (1965); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-717 (1965); Ky. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 199.335(2) (1966); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:403(A) (1964); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 22, § 3852 (1965) ; MASS. ANN. LAWS, ch. 119, § 39A (1964) ; Miss. CODE ANN. § 7185-05
(1966); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 210.105.1 (1965); MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 10-902 (1965); NES.
REv. STAT. § 28-481 (1965); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.502 (1965); N.H. STAT. ANN. § 571:26
(1965); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6-8.3 (1964); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-9-13 (1965); N.Y. PEN.
CODE § 483-d (McKinney 1964); N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-25-01 (1965); OHIO REv. CODE
ANN. § 2151.421 (1966) ; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 846 (1966); ORE. REV. STAT. § 146.750(1)
(1965); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40-13.1-3(1-2) (1965); S.C. CODE, § 20-302.1 (1965); S.D. SESS.
LAWS OF 1964, ch. 90; UTAH CODE ANN. § 55-16-2 (1965); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, ch. 26,
§ 1352 (1965); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 171 (1966); W. VA. CODE § 49-6A-2 (1965); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 48.981(1) (1965); WYO. STAT. § 14-28.1 (1963).
155. ALA. CODE tit. 27, ch. 4, § 21 (1967) ; ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-842.01(A) (1965);
CALIF. PEN. CODE § 11161.5 (West 1963) ; IND. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 1420 (1965); MIcH.
COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 722.571(1) (1968); MNN. STAT. ANN. § 626.554(2) (1965); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4330 (1965); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-318.2 (1965); TEX. Civ. STAT. art.
695c-2 (1965).
156. IOWA CODE ANN. § 235A.3 (1965); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 11A(c) (1963).
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [VOL. XXIII
not use his individual opinion as a shield if most others would have had
reason to suspect abuse. While such a provision may result in reports
of injuries that are later satisfactorily explained, it may be expected
to turn up some questionable cases where fairly well concealed abuse
has been perpetrated on the child. Where the statute covers both "be-
lieving" and "having reason to believe," added protection results. While
it may seem advisable for the reporter to have "reasonable cause"
to believe, it is suggested that an immunity provision linked to good
faith may provide all the safeguards necessary in this area, at least
where reporting is required only of professional or quasi-professional
people such as physicians, teachers, nurses and social workers. These
people are unlikely to make good faith reports that are totally unsup-
ported by evidence, and a malicious and unsupportable report would
strip them of their immunity. If the statute requires reporting by "any
person," then reasonable cause might well be required.
At least two sources recognize that a determination of abuse may be
difficult even for a physician, especially when the evidence seems mar-
ginal or abuse is not clearly indicated. 157 These sources feel that the
reporter should not be required to give an opinion indicating abuse, but
rather that his duty to report should encompass all cases where "medical
diagnosis and findings are incompatible with alleged history of how
injuries were sustained," or where "injuries differ from those likely by
the explanation." One writer would include situations involving acci-
dental injuries that seem to be the result of parental indifference.' 58 The
advantage of wording of this nature is that it relieves the reporter of
the necessity of forming an opinion as to whether or not abuse was
responsible for the trauma. However, in some instances the explanation
given might be plausible, but the reporter might still have reason to
suspect battering. It also seems that this wording would not require a
report if the parent admitted inflicting the injuries. While such a con-
struction may be deemed to be too literal, addition of only a few words
to the statute would solve the problem.
The various pieces of proposed legislation show no similarity in
this area. The Model Act uses the test of "reasonable cause to suspect."
The American Humane Association recommends the language "where
medical diagnosis and findings are incompatible with alleged history of
how injuries were sustained and the syndrome leads to the inference of
'inflicted injuries,'" a rather objective position. The New York County
Medical Society proposal recommends a subjective standard which is
somewhat limited as it applies to "wounds or injuries inflicted by the
act of another," a phrase that implies that actual knowledge on the part
of the reporter as to the cause of the trauma is required.
157. Pausen, supra note 91, at 11.
158. Id.
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3. AGE AS A LIMITATION
The age of the child is also important in determining whether a
report is required. While the typical battered child is quite young, legis-
lators have recognized that older children may similarly be endangered
by their environment and set age limits high enough to protect almost
all children. Eighteen states159 require reports if the child is under 16,
and another state16 protects children under 16 or reasonably presumed
to be so. Eighteen states 61 cover children under 18 in their provisions.
Four states provide for reporting only if the child is under 12,162 and
three states 63 set the age as under 17. The ages of under 15164 and under
19165 are used in one state each. Four states 6 6 require reporting if the
abused individual is a "minor," but their statutes do not specify further.
Two states1 67 require compliance in cases involving a "child," and one
of these states' 68 also covers instances involving "any incompetent or
disabled person." Both the recommendations of the American Humane
Association and the New York County Medical Society speak only in
terms of children without specifying an age limit, although the latter pro-
vides that one item to be considered before reporting cases of maltreat-
ment is the age of the child, which it states to be characteristically under
two. This seems to be an unfortunate provision in that it may deny some
protection to a substantially older child who has been subjected to abuse.
The Model Act proposes that the maximum age of'juvenile court jurisdic-
tion in each state be used.
159. ALA. CODE tit. 27, ch. 4, § 21 (1967); ALAS. STAT. § 11.67.070(2) (1965); ARIZ.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-842.01(E) (1965); ARK. STAT. AN'. § 42-802 (1965); FLA. STAT.
§ 828.041(2) (1963) ; ILL. ANN. STAT. cl. 23, § 2042 (1965); IND. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 1420
(1965); KAN. STAT. AN. § 38-717 (1965); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 3852 (1965);
MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 11A(c) (1963); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 119, § 39A (1964); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 571:26 (1965); N.M. STAT. ANNT. § 13-9-13 (1965); N.Y. PEN. CODE
§ 483-d (McKinney 1964); N.C. GEN. STAT, § 14-318.2 (1965); S.C. CODE, § 20-302.1 (1965);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, ch. 26, § 1352 (1965); VA. CODE § 16.1-217.1 (1968).
160. TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1202 (1966).
161. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-38a(a) (1965); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 1002 (1965);
D.C. CODE tit. 2, § 2-162 (1966); IDAHO CODE § 16-1641 (1965); IOWA CODE ANN. § 235A.3
(1965); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.335(2) (1966); MISS. CODE ANN. § 7185-05 (1966);
MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 10-902 (1965); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.502 (1965); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 9:6-8.3 (1964); N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-25-01 (1965); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.421
(1966); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4330 (1965); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40-13.1-3 (1965); S.D.
SESS. LAWS OF 1964, ch. 90; TE~x. CIV. STAT. Art. 695c-2 (1965); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 26.44.030 (1965); W. VA. CODE § 49-6A-2 (1965).
162. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-13-3 (1963); GA. CODE ANN. § 74-111(a) (1965); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 210.105.1 (1965); ORE. REV. STAT. § 146.750(1) (1965).
163. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:403(A) (1964) ; Mci. CoMPILED LAWS ANN. § 722.571(1)
(1968) ; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 846 (1966).
164. V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 172 (1966).
165. WYO. STAT. § 14-28.1 (1963).
166. CALn?. PEN. CODE § 11161.5 (West 1963); SEss. LAWS OF HAWAII, Act 261 § 2
(1967); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.554(2) (1965); UTAH CODE.ANN. § 55-16-2 (1965).
167. NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-481 (1965) ; WIS. STAT. ANN..§ 48-981(1) (1965).
168. NEI. REV. STAT. § 28-481 (1965). .
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While the abuse problem is mainly limited to younger children, it
would seem advantageous and in the best interest of the child to protect
it as long as it comes under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. The
fact that a child has attained the age of 12 or 15 years is no guarantee
that it is not subject to abuse although the method used to inflict the
injuries may be different and the child may be more capable of protecting
himself. If the aim of the statutes is to protect juveniles from abuse,
then it should protect all of them and not simply those thought to be
most likely to need protection.
4. IDENTITY OF THE ABUSER
While reporting is required in 27 states'6 9 regardless of the identity
of the perpetrator, the remaining states have provided for reporting only
when the abuse is inflicted by certain classes of persons. Parents are
singled out in 24 states 70 with good reason: it has been shown that they
are responsible for two-thirds of the incidents. 17 ' A variety of others
who have some responsibility for the child have also been named in a
number of statutes: step-parents in two states, 72 legal guardians or
custodians in seven states,'1 7 caretakers in four states,'7 4 "other persons
responsible for" the child's care in 18 states,'175 a person standing in
169. ALA. CODE tit. 27, ch. 4, § 21 (1967) ; ALAS. STAT. § 11.67.020 (1965) ; ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 13-842.01(A) (1965); CALIF. PEN. CODE § 11161.5 (West 1963); D.C. CODE
tit. 2, § 2-162 (1966) ; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, § 2042 (1965) ; IOWA CODE ANN. § 235A.3 (1965) ;
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-717 (1965) ; MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 11A(c) (1963); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 626.554(2) (1965); MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 10-902 (1965); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 200.502 (1965); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-9-13 (1965); N.Y. PEN. CODE § 483-d (McKinney
1964); N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-25-01 (1965); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.421 (1966); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 846 (1966); ORE. REV. STAT. § 146.750(1) (1965) ; PA. STAT. AxN. tit.
18, § 4330 (1965) ; TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1202 (1966) ; TEX. CIV. STAT. Art. 695c-2 (1965) ;
UTAH CODE ANN. § 55-16-2 (1965); VA. CODE § 16.1-217.1 (1968); WASH. REv. CODE AmN.
§ 26.44.030 (1965); W. VA. CODE § 49-6A-2 (1965); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 48.981(1) (1965).
170. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 42-802 (1965); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 22-13-3 (1963); CotNN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-38a(a) (1965); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 1002 (1965); FLA. STAT.
§ 828.041(2) (1963); GA. CODE ANN. § 74-111(a) (1965); IDAHO CODE § 16-1641 (1965);
IND. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 1420 (1965) ; Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.335(2) (1966) ; LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 14:403(A) (1964); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 3852 (1965); MASS. ANN.
LAWS ch. 119, § 39A (1964); MISS. CODE ANN. § 7185-05 (1966); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 210.105.1 (1965); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-481 (1965); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 571:26 (1965);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6-8.3 (1964); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-318.2 (1965); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 40-13.1-3 (1965); S.C. CODE § 20-302.1 (1965); S.D. SESS. LAWS OF 1964, ch. 90; VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 13, ch. 26, § 1352 (1965); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 172 (1966); WYO. STAT.
§ 14-28.1 (1963).
171. Ireland, supra note 7, at 115.
172. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-13-3 (1963); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-318.2 (1965).
173. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-13-3 (1963) ; IDAHO CODE § 16-1641 (1965); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 7185-05 (1966); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-481 (1965); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6-8.3
(1964); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-318.2 (1965); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40-13.1-3 (1965).
174. FLA. STAT. § 828.041(2) (1963); GA. CODE ANN. § 74-111(a) (1965); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 3852 (1965) ; WYo. STAT. § 14-28.1 (1963).
175. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 42-802 (1965); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-13-3 (1963); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-38a(a) (1965); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 1002 (1965); IND. STAT.
ANN. tit. 52, § 1420 (1965); Ky. REV. STAT. ANit. § 199.335(2) (1966); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 14:403(A) (1964); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 119, § 39A (1964); MICH. COMPILED LAWS ANN.
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loco parentis in one state, 7 6 and an agent or employee of an institution
having the authority of a parent or guardian in one state. 7 No state
specifically provides for reporting of abuse inflicted by siblings, although
this explanation is often tendered by parents and is no doubt sometimes
true. The recommendations of neither the American Humane Associa-
tion nor the New York County Medical Society place any limits on the
identity of the perpetrator, but the Model Act would limit reporting to
cases in which a "parent or other person responsible" for the child's
care could be or was suspected of having inflicted the abuse.
This issue has also provoked some amount of discussion in the
literature. The argument has been made that reporting of abuse by
persons other than parents' or caretakers is unnecessary because the
parent will protect the child from torts occurring outside the family
setting.' s This is probably true in most cases, but what if the parent
does not care or blames the injuries he has inflicted on the child on
someone outside of the family? The only solution to these problems is to
require a report to be made regardless of the identity of the purported
abuser. To allow a loophole of this nature to remain is to deny the very
protection that was intended to result and to promote fabrication by a
battering parent who is already likely to be looking for a way out.
The same authority who contends that reporting should not be re-
quired unless the injury is attributed to the neglect or abuse of the
parent or caretaker also states that the reporter should not be called on
to guess at the identity of the perpetrator. 17 9 As a practical matter, how
could such a reporter determine whether or not a report was required
without guessing at the abuser's identity? Reliance on the parent's ex-
planation would seem to be a poor solution as it might promote shifting
of the blame while the true nature of the attack could be disclosed so as
to correspond with the injuries. It is thought that a better solution would
be to require the report regardless of the assailant's identity, including
the explanation for the injuries given by the parents, and then let those
in charge of investigating the reports delve into the identity problem.
That at least partial acceptance of this solution exists is evidenced by
the statutes of the 22 states 80 which make no mention of the perpetrator
§ 722.571(1) (1968); Miss. CODE ANN. § 7185-05 (1966); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 210.105.1
(1965); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 571:26 (1965); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6-8.3 (1964); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 40-13.1-3 (1965); S.C. CODE § 20-302.1 (1965); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, ch. 26,
§ 1352 (1965); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 172 (1966).
176. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-318.2 (1965).
177. Id.
178. Paulsen, supra note 91, at 11.
179. Paulsen, supra note 91, at 10-11; accord, DeFrancis, supra note 42, at 17-18;
McCoid, supra note 37, at 44-45.
180. ALA. CODE tit. 27, ch. 4, § 21 (1967); ALAS. STAT. § 11.67.010 (1965) ; ARiuz. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 13-842.01(A) (1965); ILi.. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, § 2042 (1965); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 235A.3 (1965); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-717 (1965); Mo. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 11A(c) (1963);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.554(2) (1965); MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 10-902 (1965); NEV. RaV.
STAT. § 200.502 (1965); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-9-13 (1965); N.Y. PEN. CODE I 483-d
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and those of the three states'' which require reporting of abuse inflicted
on a child by "any person."
5. NATURE OF THE INJURIES
The statutes further attempt to give a general definition of the
nature of the injuries which must be reported. Twenty-four states. 2
require reporting only when the injuries are "serious" or "severe," and
this follows the recommendation of the Model Act. The problem with
such a specification is that it leaves a substantial amount of discretion
to the reporter as to what constitutes "serious" injuries. An objection has
also been made on the basis that reporting of injuries that may not be
considered severe may prevent later injuries which might be permanent
or fatal. 3 However, one authority states that the limitation is justified
by limited state resources and that family privacy should not be invaded
without grave reason. 4 Reporting of all injuries which are or could
reasonably be believed to be the result of abuse, whether deemed severe or
not, provides greater protection for children and is thought to justify the
possible increased cost and invasion of privacy.
The invasion of privacy contention may be raised in a number of
areas related to child battering. There is no doubt that investigation
of parental fitness and methods of discipline may constitute some inva-
sion, but this must be balanced against the state's interest in the welfare
of the child. This interest should be particularly strong where the abuse
has led to a brain-damaged or permanently crippled child, the one more
likely to be unable to support and maintain himself if he survives to
become an adult. Protection of individual children is essentially a
parental function, but where the parents not only refuse to assume this
responsibility but actively prey on the child's characteristic defense-
lessness, society must assume the role of protector, and must do so even
(McKinney 1964); N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-25-01 (1965); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.421
(1966); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 846 (1966); ORE. REV. STAT. § 146.750(1) (1965);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1202 (1966); TEX. CIV. STAT. art. 695c-2 (1965); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 55-16-2 (1965); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, ch. 26, § 1352 (1966); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 26.44.030 (1965) ; W. VA. CODE 49-6A-2 (1965).
181. CALIF. PEN. CODE § 11161.5 (West 1963); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4330 (1965);
WIs. STAT. ANN. § 48.981(1) (1965).
182. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 42-802 (1965); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-38a(a) (1965);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 1002 (1965); D.C. CODE tit. 2, § 2-162 (1966) ; KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 38-717 (1965); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.335(2) (1966); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:403(A)
(1964); MASS. ANN. LAWS, ch. 119, § 39A (1964); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 210.105.1 (1965);
MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 10-902 (1965); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-481 (1965); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 200.502 (1965); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 571:26 (1965); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6-8.3 (1964);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-9-13 (1965); N.Y. PEN. CODE § 483-d (McKinney 1964); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 14-318.2 (1965); N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-25-01 (1965); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21,
1 846 (1966) ; S.D. SEss. LAWS OF 1964, ch. 90; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, ch. 26, § 1352 (1965) ;
VA. CODE § 16.1-217.1 (1968) ; V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 172 (1966); W. VA. CODE § 49-6A-2
(1965).
183. McCoid, supra note 37, at 50-51; Paulsen, supra note 91, at 12.
184. Paulsen, supra note 91, at 12.
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though some invasion of family privacy might result. It was never in-
tended that the right to privacy should be a shield for those who would
cripple and kill their children.
The statutes of 26 states 85 specify that the injury must be thought
to have been suffered "other than by accidental means" to require a
report. This again calls for some guesswork on the part of the reporter
as information of this sort is likely to be beyond his reach. Injuries re-
sulting from battering are often explained as accidental by those respon-
sible for them and the problem is apt to ultimately boil down to one of
whether the reporter believes the parents' story. Professor Paulsen has
suggested that a report be required if the child's injuries differ from
those likely from the explanation.' 86 This proposal has the weakness of
allowing the parents to blame someone else for the injuries, thus offering
a satisfactory explanation and avoiding the reporting requirement. It
would seem preferable to require a report whenever the injuries could
reasonably be believed to accord with the symptoms of the battered
child syndrome, an opinion well within the physician's area of compe-
tence. As a number of the characteristics are not entirely medical, it is
thought that this phraseology would pose no substantial problem for
nurses, teachers and social workers. A determination of whether the
trauma was accidental could then be left to those better qualified and
in a better position to make it.
Paulsen has further recommended that accidental injuries be re-
ported if they seemed to result from parental indifference.' 87 This proposal
has obvious merit on its face, but it is difficult to see how Paulsen can
contend that a reporter should not be required to determine whether in-
juries are intentional and then, practically in the same breath, recom-
mend that accidental injuries resulting from indifference be reported. It
may well be true in some cases that there is no doubt, but it seems that,
particularly with small children who are unable to offer any explanation,
185. ARx. STAT. ANN. § 42-802 (1965); CALIF. PEN. CODE § 11161.5 (West 1963);
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-13-3 (1963); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-38a(a) (1965);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 1002 (1965); D.C. CODE tit. 2, § 2-162 (1966); FLA. STAT.
§ 828.041(2) (1963); GA. CODE ANN. § 74-111(a) (1965); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, § 2042
(1965); IND. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 1420 (1965); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.335(2) (1966);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:403(A) (1964); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 3852 (1965);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.554(2) (1965); Miss. CODE ANN. § 7185-05 (1966); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 210.105.1 (1965); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 571:26 (1965); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6-8.3
(1964); R.I. GEN. LAWS, § 40-13-3 (1965); S.C. CODE, § 20-302.1 (1965); S.D. SESS. LAWS
or 1964, ch. 90; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, ch. 26, § 1352 (1966) ; V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 172
(1966); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.44.030 (1965); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.981(1) (1965);
WYo. STAT. § 14-28.1 (1963).
186. Paulsen, supra note 91, at 11.
It is interesting to note that Paulsen subsequently recommended that a physician be
required to report only if he believed the injuries to have been inflicted other than by
accidental means, rather than if he had reason to believe. Id. at 13. This would require a
guess as to the perpetrator's state of mind and is a seeming contradiction with the proposal.
that a report be required only if the injuries differ from those likely by the explanation given.
187. Paulsen, supra note 91, at 11.
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it will be impossible to tell in many cases whether the mother let the
child play at the top of An unguarded staircase or gave him a shove
down. Further, many injuries which might result from indifference
could also occur simply because no mother, no matter how good or con-
cerned, can watch a child all the time and curious, inquisitive toddlers
are often prone to a variety of injuries which are largely unpreventable.
Again, determination of parental indifference should be left to trained
investigators as should that of the asserted accidental nature of the
injury.
Eighteen states188 further define the injury as one resulting from
or indicative of abuse, maltreatment or neglect. One state8 9 requires
compliance in cases of "neglect or sexual abuse" and another' 90 stipu-
lates that the abuse inflicted must be "unusual or unreasonable." It
should not be difficult for reporters, particularly those in the medical
profession, to form an opinion as to whether the child's injuries were
indicative of abuse or neglect. Paulsen has recommended that the words
"abuse" and "neglect" be left undefined to include all forms of physical
injuries.191 Use of both words could be construed to comprehend both
intentionally and accidentally inflicted injuries by a court which chose
to follow the spirit of the law. This should afford maximum protection
to the child endangered either by indifference or willful conduct. A dis-
junctive provision requiring a report whenever the child's injuries ac-
corded with the symptoms of the battered child syndrome or when they
were or could be believed to have resulted from abuse or neglect would
seem to provide for all contingencies. Provisions limiting themselves to
sexual abuse or "unusual or unreasonable" abuse should be modified to
include all abuse situations. Any abuse which would come to the atten-
tion of an outsider or require treatment by a physician would be highly
unlikely to be unreasonable and it is thought that qualifying the duty
to report by such wording might ultimately have the effect of raising
controversies that would better be avoided. Further, a limitation to
188. ALA. CODE tit. 27, ch. 4, § 21 (1967); ALAs. STAT. § 11.67.070(1) (1965); SESS.
LAWS OF HAWAII, Act 261 § 2 (1967); IDAHo CODE § 16-1641 (1965); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 235A.3 (1965); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-717 (1965); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 11A(c)
(1963); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.554(2) (1965); MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 10-902 (1965) ;
NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.502 (1965); N.M. REv. STAT. ANN. § 571:26 (1965); N.Y. PEN. CODE
§ 483-d (McKinney 1964); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-318.2 (1965); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2151.421 (1966); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 846 (1966); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1202
(1966); TEx. CIv. STAT, art. 695c-2 (1965); W. VA. CODE § 49-6A-2 (1965).
189. VA. CODE § 16.1-217.1 (1968).
190. UTAH CODE ANN. § 55-16-2 (1965).
191. Paulsen, supra note 91, at 11-12.
However, Paulsen further recommends that neglect be excluded from abuse statutes
because, with the exception of cases of severe malnutrition, which he would include, it is
generally beyond the physician's scope. While neglect is not within the purview of this paper,
it is admitted that severe neglect could result in injuries to the child and that this could
be a form of abuse. For instance, injuries resulting from parental indifference, which Paulsen
would deem reportable as abuse, could no doubt be construed as having been caused by
neglect.
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situations involving sexual abuse or neglect would have little or no appli-
cation to the characteristic battered child unless "neglect" was given an
extremely strained interpretation. If the object of these statutes is to
protect children from abuse, then the draftsmen should so provide with-
out the necessity of a forced construction.
In four states,.92 the statutes require that the injuries be the
result of abuse or neglect and additionally that they be inflicted other
than by accidental means. Wording such as this provides a large loophole
as it seemingly disclaims coverage of abusive incidents where the injuries
are stated to have been accidental. It has the added defect of requiring
an opinion on the part of the reporter as to whether the trauma was
accidental or intentional.
Two states' 913 provide for reporting if the injuries were "inten-
tionally inflicted" and another19 4 requires it if the injuries were "inflicted
in violation of the law." The former necessitates the previously discussed
formation of an opinion as to the state of mind of the perpetrator. The
latter seems commendable at first glance, but it must be remembered
that many would-be reporters are unlikely to be familiar with all the
statutory provisions and accompanying constructions which would result
in a report being required in a given case. It is thought that it would be
better to leave a determination of this sort to those best equipped to
make it and require a report in terminology likely to have more mean-
ing to those affected by it.
It is interesting to note that while the statutes call for reporting'
of abusive injuries sustained by a child, they fail to require a report in
situations where the child dies. At first glance this seems to be a tremen-
dous oversight, but it is thought that the vast majority of cases require
a report even in the absence of such a provision. The number of children
who succumb to abuse is relatively small, and most of them have received
medical treatment prior to death. In such cases, a report concerning the
child's injuries would be necessary even if death occurred only shortly
after arrival at the hospital as the physician would have seen a battered
child. The only difficulty comes in cases where the child is dead on arrival
or dies before being seen by a person charged with the duty to report.
Some provision should be made for these relatively rare situations, even
though the matter will probably be referred to law enforcement au-
thorities. While nothing more can be done for the fatally injured child, it
is possible that there are other children in the home who remain in danger.
The inclusion of a disjunctive provision in the statute requiring a report
in the case of injury or death would cover all possibilities and result in
192. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 42-802 (1965); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, § 2042 (1965); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 7185-05 (1966); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.44.030 (1965).
193. MICH. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 722.571(1) (1968); ORE. REv. STAT. § 146.750(1)
(1965).
194. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4330 (1965).
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protection both to the child who survives the abuse and to siblings of
those who are not so fortunate.
C. Identity of the Recipient
The question of to whom to report has almost as many solutions as
there are states. In most cases, either a county welfare agency, district
state or county attorney, juvenile court or law enforcement agency will
be designated, but more than one are enumerated in many statutes and a
number of states have added other specifications. Ten states'05 provide
for a report solely to a law enforcement agency, eight'96 for a report
solely to a welfare agency, five'97 for a report solely to the county or
district attorney, and five'9 " for reporting only to the juvenile or family
court. One state'99 requires that its reports be made solely to the medical
investigator. From here, the variation is seemingly endless.
A number of states give the reporter a choice of recipients. In five
states 00 it may be a law enforcement agency or welfare agency offering
child protective services. One state201 requires reports to be made to law
enforcement authorities or the district attorney, and another 202 adds a
welfare agency to this list. A third state203 provides a choice between
juvenile court and law enforcement officers, while a fourth204 allows a
choice between juvenile court and welfare authorities with a direction
to report to law enforcement personnel if the former do not exist. An-
other state20 5 similarly provides for reporting to a law enforcement
agency only if no welfare agency exists in the vicinity, but directs such
law enforcement agencies to immediately forward the information received
to the nearest welfare agency. One state20 6 gives a broad choice of the
195. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-842.01(A) (1965); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 42-803 (1965) ;
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-13-3 (1963); D.C. CODE tit. 2, § 2-163 (1966); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 14:403(B) (1964) ; Mo. ANN. STAT. § 210.105.2 (1965); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.502
(1965); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.421 (1966); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 173 (1966);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.44.030 (1965).
196. SESS. LAWS OF HAWAII, Act 261 § 2 (1967) ; IDAHO CODE § 16-1641 (1965); MASS.
ANN. LAWS ch. 119, § 39A (1964); N.Y. PEN. CODE § 483-d (McKinney 1964); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 14-318.2 (1965); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40-13.3 (1965); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, ch. 26,
§ 1353 (1965); WYO. STAT. § 14-28.2 (1963).
197. MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 10-902 (1965); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-481 (1965); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 9:6-8.3 (1964); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-9-13 (1965); W. VA. CODE § 49-6A-2
(1965).
198. FLA. STAT. § 828.041(3) (1965); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-717 (1965); S.D. SESS.
LAWS OF 1964, ch. 90; TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1202 (1966).
199. ORE. REV. STAT. § 146.750(2) (1965).
200. ALA. CODE tit. 27, ch. 4, § 21 (1967); CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-38a(b) (1965);
IND. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 1421 (1965); UTAH CODE ANN. § 55-16-3 (1965) ; WIs. STAT. ANN.
§ 48.981(1) (1965).
201. CALIF. PEN. CODE § 11161.5 (West 1963).
202. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 846 (1966).
203. VA. CODE § 16.1-217.1 (1968).
204. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4330 (1965).
205. ALAS. STAT. § 11.67.020 (1965).
206. TEx. CrV. STAT. art. 695c-2 (1965).
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juvenile court, district or county attorney, law enforcement agency or
county probation officer. One state °7 that lists public health nurses and
welfare workers as required reporters directs them to report to the county
health officer or, if none exists, to a physician who is required to report
if he concurs after examination of the child. Still another state20 1 gives a
reporter a choice between a welfare agency, law enforcement agency and
the county attorney.
Allowing a choice of recipients has the advantage of letting the re-
porter pick whichever agency he would prefer to work with or thinks
should handle the case. However, this is outweighed by disadvantages such
as the resultant confusion that may ensue, the difficulty of keeping
statistics and the possibility that similar cases will be handled differ-
ently.2 9 To provide the most benefit "it is particularly essential to foster
a cooperative working relationship between the social agencies, the courts,
and law enforcement agencies. Without planned cooperative effort, there
is a possibility of conflict which results in a lack of protection for the
abused child." 1' If a reporter is given a choice and this cooperation is
lacking, it is entirely possible that agencies whose services might be bene-
ficial to the child might never be notified of the case. For this reason it is
essential that all reports be made to one office in the city or county and
that legislative guidance be given for their conduct of the case.
Some states provide for reporting to two or more recipients. There
is little if any agreement between these states as illustrated by their provi-
sions. One state21' requires reporting to the welfare agency and county
attorney; another 212 provides for triplicate reports with a copy to the
prosecuting attorney, local welfare agency and state welfare agency; a
third211 orders the report to be made to "any person designated" by the
juvenile court and to the welfare agency; a fourth214 requires reporting to
a law enforcement agency which must then notify the welfare agency, and
a fifth 215 reverses this by having the report go to the welfare agency
which then notifies the law enforcement authorities. A sixth2 6 requires
the report to be made to both law enforcement and welfare authorities
with a direction that the police shall notify the welfare agency upon
receipt of a report. The advantage of multiple reports is that the agencies
involved receive the information first-hand and are then able to start
investigating the situation. This solves the problem of one agency failing
207. GA. CODE ANN. § 74-111(b) (1965).
208. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 846 (1966).
209. Paulsen, supra note 91, at 46.
210. Rubin, supra note 37, at 233.
211. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 3852 (1965).
212. MIcEr. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 722.571(2) (1968).
213. Miss. CODE ANN. § 7185-05 (1966).
214. ALAS. STAT. § 11.67.020 (1965).
215. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 571:27 (1965).
216. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.554(2) (1965).
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to contact another. However, the problem of cooperation between them
may still exist if not spelled out in the statute.
Three states117 call for reporting to an authority in the county where
the child resides. This limitation on the recipient is beneficial to the child
as it discourages shopping for treatment in different counties by the
parents. It further makes the task of investigation easier in that the home
and parents are more readily available to the investigators. However, the
three states having limitations of this nature show no agreement on to
whom the report is to be made in the given county: one218 prescribes the
county attorney, another210 the family court, and the third221 the welfare
agency.
Two states designate the welfare agency as recipient of the re-
ports but permit additional reports to others. One22' allows a report to be
made to law enforcement authorities with notice of this given to the
welfare agency, and the other2 22 allows a report to be made additionally
to the juvenile court or state attorney if immediate action is deemed
necessary. Assuming that the welfare agency would cooperate with the
other authorities, a provision of this sort simply brings these other
agencies into the case sooner and may afford an added degree of protec-
tion to the child who is in immediate danger of further abuse. In this
context, the importance of cooperation cannot be stressed enough, as
"in order to provide adequate child protection services, definite procedures
must.be worked out in each community so that the physicians and hos-
pitals, law enforcement officers, social welfare agencies, and the courts
are clear about their own functions as part of an over-all plan. 228 Un-
fortunately, few states provide clearly for post-report investigations or
define the obligations of those authorities involved. 24
Perhaps the best provisions are those which require both oral and
written reports. Both the Model Act and the proposal of the New York
County Medical Society include such provisions. Fifteen states2 5 require
that such an oral report be made immediately to the same authority who
will receive the written report which follows and gives additional informa-
217. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 1003 (1965); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6-8.3 (1964) ; N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 14-318.2 (1965).
218. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6-8.3 (1964).
219. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 1003 (1965).
220. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-318.2 (1965).
221. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, § 2043 (1965).
222. N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-25-01 (1965).
223. Rubin, supra note 37, at 233.
224. McCoid, supra note 37, at 52.
225. COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 22-13-3 (1963); D.C. CODE tit. 2, § 2-163 (1966); SESS.
LAWS OF HAWAII, Act 261 § 2 (1967) ; IND. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 1421 (1965); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 14:403(B) (1964); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 199.335(3) (1966); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 626.554(3) (1965); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 210.105.2 (1965); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 571:27
(1965); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2151.421 (1966); ORE. REV. STAT. § 146.750(2) (1965);
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40-13.1-3 (1965); UTAH CODE ANN. § 55-16-3 (1965); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
13, ch. 26, § 1353 (1965); WYO. STAT. § 14-28.2 (1963).
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tion. Two states226 which require the written report to be made to a wel-
fare agency and a state or county attorney provide that the oral report is
to be made to the welfare agency and also to a law enforcement author-
ity if the child is deemed to be in immediate danger. The use of oral and
written reports promotes quicker attention for the child's problems and
yet gives a permanent record to be relied upon. The oral report need not
have great depth 22  and will usually be made by telephone, enabling
investigation to begin before the child is released from the hospital or
soon thereafter. This may easily result in a saving of two or three days'
time which may protect the child from further abuse. The written report
can then be filled out later giving as much information as possible, and
sent to the designated recipient, 28 the time element in this process thus
being substantially shorter. Where such a system exists, it has been found
that the written reports have followed up the oral ones in 90% of the
cases.
229
Discussions of to whom a report should be made have been the
subject of much literature. Most authorities seem to agree that the wel-
fare agencies are the most desirable recipients, but many note that some
difficulty may arise because they are not available on a 24-hour basis
in many communities. 3 In such cases, law enforcement authorities may
be the only available recipients, especially of oral reports. It is this
problem that may have prompted some states to require reporting either
to the law enforcement agencies alone or to the welfare agencies. The
reluctance of physicians to report to a punitive agency has been noted
by one writer who feels that physicians would understandably be more
willing to help protect the child than to become involved in a criminal
proceeding to punish the parents.2 ' While reporters may prefer the re-
cipient to be a social rather than a legal agency, cooperation between
these agencies will no doubt result in a certain amount of prosecution no
matter who receives the report. The fact must also be recognized, how-
ever, that some people are more willing to cooperate with social workers
than with police, and this is undoubtedly true of parents.2 32 An accusa-
torial tone is likely to reduce whatever willingness to cooperate which
may have existed and make it more difficult to get the actual facts. 3
For these reasons, it seems advisable to use social workers wherever pos-
226. IOWA CODE ANN. § 235A.4 (1965); MD. ANx. CODE art. 27, § 11A(d) (1963).
227. McCoid, supra note 37, at 51; Comment, Legislation as Protection for the Battered
Child, supra note 141, at 321.
228. Id.
229. Ireland, supra note 7, at 115.
230. Paulsen, supra note 91, at 44-45; Am. Acad. of Pediatrics Committee on Infants
and Pre-School Children, Maltreatment of Children-The Physically Abused Child, 37
PEniAmcs 380 (1966); McCoid, supra note 37, at 55; Comment, Legislation as Protection
for the Battered Child, supra note 141, at 320.
231. McCoid, supra note 37, at 55; Paulsen, supra note 91, at 44-45.
232. Rubin, supra note 37, at 234.
233. Elmer, supra note 22, at 33.
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sible and let the legal authorities take over only if no social welfare
agency exists or if a decision to prosecute has been made based on the
social workers' findings.
Little has been written about the merits of having reports made
to family or juvenile courts. Where such courts are well developed, this
could be an ideal solution. The juvenile court is more likely to operate
around the clock than the welfare agencies, and its position as a protector
of children has long been recognized. It has both social and legal com-
ponents and could provide a framework for dealing with investigation
and other matters which might ultimately have a bearing on custody or
dependency of the child. If the investigation disclosed little chance of
keeping the family together as a unit, it could recommend prosecution of
the parents. The family court has all the advantages of the juvenile
court and additionally could deal with all the problems relating to the
parents instead of referring them to other courts.234 By requiring reports
to whichever of these courts existed in the county, benefits to and protec-
tion of the child could be maximized without the disadvantages inherent
in reporting to a purely legal recipient such as law enforcement authori-
ties or a prosecutor.
The proposed legislation in this area shows a lack of uniformity.
The American Humane Association recommends that reports be made
"to the public or voluntary Child Welfare service which carries the
child protective function in the community." The New York County
Medical Society proposal calls for oral and written reports to be made
"to the Child Protective Agency, The Society for Prevention of Cruelty
to Children, or the sheriff . . . ." if the reporting institution is located
outside the town or city limits. The Model Act calls for both oral and
written reports to be made to "an appropriate police authority," leaving
it to each state to designate such an authority.
D. Contents of the Report
The contents of the report usually supply some or all of the informa-
tion proposed by the Model Act. This includes:
the names and addresses of the child and his parents or other
persons responsible for his care, if known, the child's age, the
nature and extent of the child's injuries (including any evidence
of previous injuries), and any other information that the physi-
cian believes might be helpful in establishing the cause of the
injuries and the identity of the perpetrator.
The American Humane Association has made no recommendations in
this area. The proposed legislation of the New York County Medical So-
ciety would simplify the contents, including only "the name of the in-
jured person, if known, his whereabouts, the character and extent of his
234. Comment, 45 ORE. L. REv. 114, 123 (1966).
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injuries and the person who inflicted such injuries, if known." It is
thought that the Model Act proposal is preferable because of the greater
breadth of the report. While it is admitted that it may be impossible to
obtain all of this information in some cases, it should be available in most
and would provide the investigative agency to whom the report is made
with a more complete picture of the situation.
E. Immunities Granted to Reporters
As an incentive to reporting, all of the states have included im-
munity provisions in their statutes, some more complete than others.
Only six states2 35 provide a totally unqualified immunity, the majority
requiring good faith in reporting. Thirty-seven states"' impose this
good faith provision, but ten237 have a presumption of good faith, statu-
tory or otherwise. One state 238 achieves basically the same result as the
"good faith" states by providing immunity if the report is made without
malice. One state239 grants immunity to anyone acting "on reasonable
cause" and another24 with the same provision adds the good faith re-
quirement. One state241 provides immunity from criminal liability
only and then only if the report is made in good faith. The remaining
states give an unqualified immunity, but limit it to certain circum-
stances. Five states242 provide this immunity but make no mention
235. ALA. CODE tit. 27, ch. 4, § 23 (1965) ; ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-842.01 (C) (1965) ;
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-13-6 (1963); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-481(2) (1965); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 9:6-8.6 (1964); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.421 (1966).
236. ALAS. STAT. § 11.67.050 (1965); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 42-804 (1965); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 17-38a(c) (1965); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 1004 (1965); D.C. CODE tit. 2,
§ 2-164 (1966); GA. CODE ANN. § 74-111(c) (1965); SESS. LAWS OF HAWAII, Act 261 § 4
(1967); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, § 2045 (1965); IrND. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 1423 (1965);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 235A.7 (1965); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:403(c) (1964); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 22, § 3854 (1965); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 119, § 39A (1964); MICH. COMPILED
LAWS ANN. § 722.571(3) (1968); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.554(5) (1965); MISS. CODE ANN.
§ 7185-05 (1966); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 210.105.3 (1965); MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 10-904
(1965); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.505 (1965); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 571:28 (1965); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 13-9-15 (1965); N.Y. PEN. CODE § 483-d (McKinney 1964); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 14-318.2 (1965) ; N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-25-04 (1965) ; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 847
(1966); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40-13.1-6 (1965); S.C. CODE § 20-302.3 (1965) ; S.D. SEss. LAWS
OF 1964, ch. 90; TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1202 (1966); TEX. CIV. STAT. § 695c-2 (1965);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 55-16-4 (1965); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, ch. 26, § 1354 (1966); VA.
CODE § 16.1-217.1 (1968); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 174 (1966) ; W. VA. CODE § 49-6A-4
(1965); WYO. STAT. § 14-28.4 (1963).
237. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 42-804 (1965); FLA. STAT. § 828.041(4) (1963); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 23, § 2045 (1965); MICH. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 722.571(3) (1968); MISS. CODE
ANN. § 7185-05 (1966); MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 10-904 (1965); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-9-15
(1965); S.C. CODE § 20-302.3 (1965); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1202 (1966); W. VA. CODE
§ 49-6A-4 (1965).
238. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-718 (1965).
239. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.335(4) (1966).
240. ORE. REV. STAT. § 146.760 (1965).
241. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.981(2) (1965).
242. CALIF. PEN. CODE § 11161.5 (West 1963); MICH. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 722.571(3)
(1968) ; N.Y. PEN. CODE § 483-d (McKinney 1964); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4330 (1965);
TEX. CIv. STAT. § 695c-2 (1965). It is uncertain whether the immunity extends to participation
in judicial proceedings in Tennessee. TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1202 (1966).
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of immunity from liability resulting from participation in judicial pro-
ceedings. One state,24" taking almost the opposite position, provides
unqualified immunity from civil liability only and then only to those
testifying in "any proceedings under this chapter" and not thus to all
reporters. Two more states24 4 simply grant the immunity from civil
liability only and another24 does so only if the report is not made in bad
faith. One state24 requiring good faith for other reporters grants un-
qualified immunity to doctors and hospital staff for any liability for
disclosure of matters which might be considered confidential under a
physician-patient relationship. The Model Act imposes the good faith
requirement but extends this immunity to all reporters for any liability
that might result therefrom. The New York County Medical Society
proposal provides unqualified immunity without any requirement of
good faith, but makes no mention of possible criminal liability, stating
only that the immunity is from civil liability. The American Medical
Association recommends that immunity be provided to all reporters act-
ing in good faith and on reasonable evidence.
24 7
An immunity provision is undoubtedly indispensable to a successful
reporting statute. As one of the primary objectives of these statutes has
been to discover cases of abuse through the help of the medical profes-
sion, the cooperation and assistance of these individuals and institutions
could not be expected if compliance would result in liability. The most
fertile grounds for suit following a report would seem to be defamation of
character or malicious prosecution, both of which require proof of mali-
cious motive. 4 8 It is unlikely that a parent or other abuser would be able
to meet this standard of proof in the vast majority of cases, but the
addition of statutory immunity of one sort or another should erase or
immensely diminish the possibility of suit, depending on the extent of
immunity granted.
The biggest difference in the statutes in this area is the presence
or absence of a good faith requirement. Where such a requirement exists,
it is possible that suit may still be initiated and the reporter faced with
the attendant inconvenience and aggravation. Even if the plaintiff should
fail to prove lack of good faith or malicious motive, the reporter will
have been put to considerable trouble. Especially in the case of physi-
cians and institutions, the time element may prove quite costly. If the
plaintiff is unsuccessful, the reporter might have a remedy for malicious
prosecution, but this would be equally time-consuming. Furthermore,
in view of the educational and economic characteristics of most abusive
parents, there is some doubt as to whether they would be able to satisfy
243. IDAHO CODE § 16-1641 (1965).
244. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 11A(g) (1963); WAsn. REV. CODE ANN, § 26.44.060
(1965).
245. VA. CODE § 16.1-217.1 (1968).
246. IND. STAT. ANN. fit. 52, § 1423 (1965).
247. Editorial, J.A.M.A., ;spra note 150.
248. Harper, supra note 39, at 899.
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a judgment entered against them. Inclusion of a presumption of good
faith in the statute does little more than increase the plaintiff's burden
of proof somewhat, and the existence of such a presumption would
probably not deter an outraged parent from instituting a suit. So far,
however, there seem to have been no suits based on reports made pur-
suant to these statutes.
The statutes which provide for complete and unqualified immunity
present other objections. It is possible that a few reports in these states
might be maliciously made and that the parents would be placed at the
mercy of such reporters. The damaging effect of such reports on the
parents can be minimized by careful and discreet investigation. Prob-
lems of this nature are more likely to arise where the classes of reporters
are large, as it is unlikely that a physician or institution would report
maliciously. Statutes which cover reporters only if acting in an official
capacity may also reduce the problem, especially where classes of re-
porters are limited to those who deal with children in a professional capac-
ity. The complete and unqualified privilege can be a genuine incentive
to reporting by those with a sense of professional responsibility, and,
if the class of protected reporters is limited with an eye toward this,
little if any difficulty should be encountered with malicious reports.
In the states where unqualified but seemingly incomplete immunity
is granted there is less of a problem than may appear. These states
make no mention of immunity for statements made in judicial proceed-
ings. The courts have held that all testimony in such proceedings pro-
vides absolute immunity, even if it is perjured or false.249 While this
affords the protection that might seem to be lacking from the statute, the
question is whether a would-be reporter would know of this. In the
majority of cases such reporters probably never consider the fact that
the statutory immunity is limited to the report itself. For those who
might notice the absence, it is thought that it would be wiser to spell
out the extent of the immunity in the statute, rather than allowing
some possible uncertainty to exist in the minds of those affected by it.
Similarly, the immunity granted should extend to all reporters regardless
of whether they testify in a judicial proceeding, and this should be
clearly stated. It is ridiculous to allow a suit to be brought against a
reporter simply because those investigating felt that prosecution was
not needed to protect the child. As it is likely that many investigations
confirming the abuse will not result in prosecution, it is more important
to clearly immunize the reporter than the witness in court who is pro-
tected without specific statutory provision.
F. Abrogation of Evidentiary Privileges
Closely related to immunity provisions are those which abrogate
certain evidentiary privileges, mostly those between physician and pa-
249. W. PROSSER, TORTS 797 (3d ed. 1964).
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tient and husband and wife. The physician-patient privilege specifically
cannot be raised in 34 states,250 although it is unlikely that it would
have any application if the attempt was made. The existence of the
privilege is based on the confidential relationship which is necessary for
the physician to be able to give the patient the best treatment. While it
is unquestionably beneficial to the parents to have an injured child receive
competent and informed medical aid, the physician, especially in abuse
cases, must remember that the child is his patient rather than the parents,
and that the act of beating a child is not a privileged communication. "The
moral responsibility of the examining physician is to the maltreated child;
he must be aware that over 50 percent of these children are liable to
secondary injuries or death if appropriate steps are not taken to remove
them from their environment."'2 1 For this reason, the physician who sees
the abused child in private practice should attempt to have him hospital-
ized to evaluate his injuries and provide protection. A court order may
be obtained if the parents refuse to allow hospitalization. 5 2 Hospitaliza-
tion of the child further allows the physician time to obtain consulting
opinions without jeopardizing the child's welfare by returning him to
abusive parents.253 The privilege thus seems to be unavailable to parents
seeking to prevent dissemination of the facts regarding the cause of their
child's injuries. However, statutory abrogation of the privilege makes an
argument of this sort unnecessary and is likely to encourage reporting
from a profession which has a history steeped with protection of confi-
dential communications.
The husband-wife privilege has also been abrogated in 20 states;254
250. ALA. CODE tit. 27, ch. 4, § 24 (1967); ALAS. STAT. § 11.67.060 (1965); ARiZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 13-842.01(C) (1965); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 42-805 (1965); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 22-13-6 (1963) ; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 1005 (1965) ; FLA. STAT. § 828.041(5) (1963) ;
SESS. LAWS OF HAWAII, Act 261 § 6 (1967) ; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, § 2046 (1965); IND.
STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 1425 (1965); IOWA CODE ANN. § 235A.8 (1965); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-
719 (1965); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.335(5) (1966); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:403(D)
(1964); MIcH. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 722.571(4) (1968); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.554(6)
(1965); Mo. ANN. STAT. 210.105.4 (1965); MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 10-905 (1965); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 28-482 (1965); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.506 (1965); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 571:29 (1965) ; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-9-16 (1965); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53.01 (1965);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-25-05 (1965); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.421 (1966); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 21, § 848 (1966) ; ORE. REV. STAT. § 146.770 (1965) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4330
(1965); S.D. SEss. LAWS OF 1964, ch. 90; UTAH CODE ANN. § 55-16-5 (1965); VA. CODE
§ 16.1-217.1 (1968) ; V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 175 (1966) ; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.44.060
(1965); WYo. STAT. § 14-28.5 (1963).
251. Fontana, supra note 6, at 1393.
252. Am. Acad. of Pediatrics Committee on Infant and Pre-School Children, supra note
230, at 379.
253. Id.
254. ALA. CODE tit. 27, ch. 4, § 24 (1967) ; ALAS. STAT. § 11.67.060 (1965) ; ARK. STAT.
ANN. § 42-805 (1965); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 1005 (1965); SESS. LAWS OF HAWAII,
Act 261 § 6 (1967) ; IDAHO CODE § 16-1641 (1965) ; IND. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 1425 (1965) IOWA
CODE ANN. § 235A.8 (1965); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.335(5) (1966); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 14:403(D) (1964); MICH. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 722.571(4) (1968); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 626.554(6) (1965); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 210.105.4 (1965); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 571:29
(1965); N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-25-05 (1965); ORE. REV. STAT. § 146.770 (1965) ; S.D. SESS.
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although one. 55 limits its scope to situations involving criminal child
abuse cases. The importance of this is obvious when it is considered
that abuse customarily takes place in the home when outsiders are un-
likely to be present. Often only the parents know the cause of the trauma
inflicted on the child. To allow the abusive spouse to batter the child
and then prevent the other from telling of it is to promote activity of
this sort and to further endanger the child. It was never intended that
the privilege should be available as a shield for parents accused of batter-
ing their children, but since the privilege existed at common law, it must
be specifically excluded in cases of this sort if the child is to be protected.
One state2 6 provides that either privilege may be abrogated in any
proceeding before the juvenile court involving the welfare of the child.
This would seem to imply that the privileges would be available in
criminal abuse actions but not in custody proceedings. It is thought that
this produces an unfortunate result as prosecution may be hindered in
cases felt to require it. While custody hearings may protect the child
adequately, the abusive parent may go scot free by invoking these
privileges to effectively muzzle those who would be most likely to know
of his conduct.
No mention is made of abrogation of any privilege in the statutes
of 16 states.25 7 In some instances they have been abrogated by other
statutes or case law. However, it seems that both may be in force in
abuse cases in some states. While this should not be an insurmountable
obstacle in the case of the physician-patient privilege, real difficulties
may arise with the existence of interspousal immunity. It is thought
that both the physician-patient and the husband-wife privileges should
be specifically abrogated both to encourage reporting and to afford the
greatest protection to the child. This proposal follows that of the Model
Act. The suggested legislation of both the American Humane Associa-
tion and the New York County Medical Society would limit such a pro-
vision to the physician-patient privilege.
One further problem is found in the one states1 that requires report-
ing of attorneys. While the end of protecting the child is laudable, it is
questionable whether an attorney can properly be required to report
and what consequences might follow if he did. Such a report would seem
LAWS OF 1964, ch. 90; VA. CODE § 16.1-217.1 (1968) ; V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 175 (1966)
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.44.060 (1965).
255. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.44.060 (1965).
256. D.C. CODE tit. 2, § 2-165 (1966).
257. CALIF. PEN. CODE § 11161.5 (West 1963); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-38a (1965);
GA. CODE ANN. § 74-111 (1965); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 3851-55 (1965); MD. ANN.
CODE art. 27, § 11A (1963) ; MASS. ANN. LAWS, ch. 119, § 39A-B (1964); Miss. CODE
ANN. § 7185-05 (1966); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6-8 (1964); N.Y. PEN. CODE § 483-d (McKinney
1964); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40-13.1 (1965); S.C, CODE § 20-302 (1965); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 37-1202 to 1207 (1966); TEx. CIV. STAT. § 695c-2 (1965); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, ch. 26,
§ 1351-55 (1965); W. VA. CODE § 49-6A-1 to -4 (1965); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.981 (1965).
258. NEv. REv. STAT. § 200.502 (1965).
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to be in direct violation of Canon 37 of the American Bar Association's
Code of Professional Ethics.259 As the attorney-client privilege was not
abrogated in that one state requiring reporting by attorneys, it seems that
an attorney who learned of child abuse committed by a client through
a confidential communication could stand on this privilege with a rela-
tive degree of safety. The statute in question should be amended to
provide for this problem.
G. The Central Registry
As abuse is often repetitive,260 a number of authorities have recog-
nized the need for a compilation facility to keep track of multiple in-
stances of battering involving the same child or family. As parents often
use different physicians or hospitals each time, the physician examining
the child is likely to be unaware of any previous incidents. From a
medical point of view this is not a great problem in obvious cases of
abuse. However, many cases raise a suspicion of abuse but still leave room
for doubt.
An attempt has been made to solve this problem in five states
261
through the creation under statute of central registries. One author has
even suggested that a nationwide registry might be desirable.262 These
registries compile the data from reports and maintain a file on the child
and family. They further provide "a base for indicating the incidence
of child abuse, further defining the problem, and aiding in developing and
analyzing a program to deal with it." 6' A telephone call regarding a
questionable case will provide information as to whether the injured
child or other children in the family have been the subjects of previous
259. Canon 37 states:
It is the duty of a lawyer to preserve his client's confidences. This duty outlasts
the lawyer's employment, and extends as well to his employees; and neither of them
should accept employment which involves or may involve the disclosure of these
confidences, either for the private advantage of the lawyer or his employees or to
the disadvantage of the client, without his knowledge and consent, and even though
there are other available sources of such information. A lawyer should not continue
employment when he discovers that this obligation prevents the performance of his
full duty to his former or to his new client.
If a lawyer is accused by his client, he is not precluded from disclosing the
truth in respect to the accusation. The announced intention of a client to commit a
crime is not included within the confidences which he is bound to respect. He may
properly make such disclosures as may be necessary to prevent the act or protect
those against whom it is threatened.
260. Gillespie, supra note 5, at 527; McHenry, supra note 9, at 906; Elmer, supra note
7, at 183.
Gillespie reported that 12 of 13 children studied who survived the original abuse were
later reinjured, while McHenry and Elmer found five of 43 surviving children suffered
subsequent abuse. It has further been stated that the child who is the subject of two abuse
hearings seldom lives to see a third. Hansen, Suggested Guidelines for Child Abuse Laws,
7 J. FAmIY L. 64-65 (1967).
261. CALIF. PEN. CODE § 11161.5 (West 1963); SEss. LAWS or HAWAII, Act 261 § 3
(1967); ILL. A". STAT. ch. 23, § 2047 (1965); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 11A(h) (1963);
VA. CODE § 16.1-217.1 (1968).
262. Paulsen, supra note 91, at 25.
263. Ireland, supra note 7, at 115.
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instances of abuse. An affirmative reply is an obvious aid to the physician
in making his diagnosis. The registry can also be useful in situations
where prosecution or removal of the child from the home is contem-
plated.264
Certain problems are inherent in a central registry system. First,
the physician must not allow himself to be unduly swayed by the exis-
tence of previous incidents.6 5 Active children are prone to a variety of
normal accidents which could be interpreted as resulting from abuse
by a physician who was looking primarily for battering. Even if a post-
report investigation discloses that the injuries were entirely accidental,
some stigma may attach to the parents who are apt to feel outraged that
their completely truthful explanation was not accepted. Secondly, reports
that prove to be incorrect must be removed from the registry.266 If this
is not done, every non-abusive injury suffered by the children in the
family becomes an invitation to investigation and accusation even in
cases where abuse was not seriously considered as the cause of the
trauma. One authority has recommended that the registries include only
those reports on which action has been taken.267 This seems unwise as
such a provision would provide no protection for the child in cases where
prosecution was declined or unsuccessful but the existence of abuse has
been established. It is thus thought that reports clearly indicating abuse
and those in which no determination could be made should continue to be
filed to give the greatest protection to the child. As an adjunct to this,
some authorities have proposed maintenance of a temporary file as well
as a permanent registry.168 Under this scheme, a report would be placed
first in the temporary file until investigation determined that it was
based on fact or that doubt continued, at which time it would be trans-
ferred to the registry.
Closely connected to these problems are cases in which the physician
has a suspicion of abuse but no further real evidence. Establishment of
suspicion registries has been recommended to meet this problem.20 Such
a registry would include cases in which no report was made but the possi-
bility of abuse existed to a lesser degree. Existence of such a registry
would enable different physicians who had treated the child to consult to
determine whether the syndrome seemed to be present. The danger of
this system is that two suspicions may add up to a case of abuse where
neither, standing alone, would be sufficient. ° Whether the system finds
acceptance depends largely on whether abuse was actually inflicted.
264. Paulsen, supra note 91, at 25.
265. Id. at 31.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 31; Am. Scad. of Pediatrics Committee on Infant and Pre-School Children,
supra note 230, at 380.
269. Paulsen, supra note 91, at 26.
270. Id. at 31.
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Those who discover actual cases of abuse by piecing together suspicions
will be praised for protecting the child, while if no abuse occurred, much
criticism will result.
The identity of the agency maintaining the registries varies. A
welfare agency is responsible in three states,"' a law enforcement agency
in a fourth2 72 and the Bureau of Vital Statistics was selected by the
fifth.27 ' The American Academy of Pediatrics Committee on Infant and
Pre-School Children recommends the city or county department of health
or welfare be selected.274 The identity is largely immaterial as long as
the job is done properly, but it would undoubtedly be helpful if informa-
tion was available on a 24-hour basis. Such availability contemplates
use of the registry by telephone, and, if oral reports are required, the
recipient might well be the one to maintain the registry. Such a system
would require only one phone call to both report the abuse and discover
if a previous history existed. The advantage of having the registry
available around the clock lies in the fact that the physician can have
the information while still treating the child and may recommend hospi-
talization rather than release in situations where there is reason to believe
that the child's injuries are part of a continuing pattern of abuse.
In addition, maintenance of a central registry raises the problem
of who should have access to the information it contains, especially in
cases where the perpetrator is not conclusively known as this may well
constitute invasion of privacy.27 While it seems unwise to open it to
the public or restrict its use to physicians only, some line must obviously
be drawn. If the classes of persons required to report is not too broad,
the limitation could follow these lines. However, it would seem that the
greatest benefit of the system would accrue to physicians, the courts and
the various law enforcement agencies. These groups have sufficient reason
for needing the information to justify a possible invasion of family
privacy. One group recommends that access be limited to physicians,
hospital administrators and social workers.2 76 The social welfare agencies
might well be expected to maintain their own records as investigation
of previous cases should provide this information. If the welfare agency
is in charge of maintaining the registry, duplication of effort would be
decreased and it is thought that this would provide the most satisfactory
solution.
271. SESS. LAWS OF HAWAII, ACT 261 § 3 (1967); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, § 2047 (1965);
MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 11A(h) (1963).
272. State Bureau of Criminal Identification and Investigation. CALIF. PEN. CODE § 11161.5
(West 1963).
273. VA. CODE § 16.1-217.1 (1968).
274. Am. Acad. of Pediatrics Committee on Infant and Pre-School Children, supra
note 230, at 380.
275. Paulsen, supra note 91, at 31.
276. Am. Acad. of Pediatrics Committee on Infant and Pre-School Children, supra
note 230, at 380.
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H. The Effect of Failure to Report
The problem of what penalty, if any, to impose for violation of the
reporting statutes is one that continues to be in dispute. No penalty is
provided in the statutes of 25 states,277 but there is considerable diver-
gence among the remainder. One difference in opinion involves the
existence of intent. Seventeen states2 78 require that the failure to report
must be "knowingly and willfully" done. Two states279 require only that
it be done willfully and one280 uses only the word "knowingly." Five
states281' disregard the intent element and provide a penalty simply for
"violating the statute."
The nature of the penalty also differs considerably among the states.
In 11 states,282 violation is stated to be a misdemeanor and the penalties
for misdemeanors are applied. In one state, 8 ' the penalty for a mis-
demeanor is applied if the defendant is found guilty, but the defendant
who pleads guilty is subject to a fine of $50, three months in jail, or both.
A number of other states provide that the defendant may be both fined
and imprisoned. One state284 provides for six months' imprisonment, a
fine of $500 or both; two 28 5 state the penalty as $100, ten days or both;
two others28 provide for a fine of $500, a year's imprisonment or both;
277. ALAS. STAT. § 11.67.010-070 (1965) ; COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-13-1 to -7 (1963) ;
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-38a (1965) ; D.C. CODE tit. 2, § 2-161 to 166 (1966); GA. CODE
ANm. § 74-111 (1965); SEss. LAWS OF HAWAII, ACT 261 (1967); IDAHO CODE § 16-1641
(1965); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, § 2041-2047 (1965); IND. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 1419-25
(1965); IOWA CODE ANN. § 235A (1965); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 11A (1963); MASS.
ANN. LAWS ch. 119, § 39A-B (1964); Miss. CODE ANN. § 7185-05 (1966); MONT. REV. CODE
ANN. § 10-901 to -905 (1965); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-9-12- to -16 (1965); N.Y. PEN. CODE
§ 483-d (McKinney 1964); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-318.2, § 8-53.01 (1965); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 50-25-01 to -05 (1965); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.421 (1966); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 40-13.1 (1965) ; TEX. CIv. STAT. § 695c-2 (1965) ; VA. CODE § 16.1-217.1 (1968) ; WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 26.44.010 to 060 (1965); W. VA. CODE § 49-6A-1 to -4 (1965).
278. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 42-806 (1965); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 1006 (1965); FLA.
STAT. § 828.041(6) (1963); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-720 (1965); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 199.335(6) (1966); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:403(E) (1964); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
22, § 3855 (1965) ; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.554(7) (1965); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.507 (1965) ;
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 571:30 (1965); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6-8.7 (1964); ORE. REV.
STAT. § 146.990 (1965) ; S.D. SESS. LAWS OF 1964, ch. 90; UTAH CODE ANN. § 55-16-6 (1965) ;
V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 176 (1966); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.981 (1965) ; WYO. STAT. § 14-28.6
(1963).
279. NEB. REv. STAT. § 28-484 (1965) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4330 (1965).
280. ALA. CODE tit. 27, ch. 4, § 25 (1967).
281. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13.842.01(D) (1965); MICH. COMPILED LAWS ANN.
§ 722.572(5) (1968); S.C. CODE § 20-302.4 (1965); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1203 (1966);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, cl. 26, § 1355 (1966).
282. CALIF. PEN. CODE § 11161.5 (West 1963); FLA. STAT. § 828.041(6) (1963); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 38-720 (1965); MICH. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 722.571(5) (1968); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 626.554(7) (1965) ; NEV. REv. STAT. § 200.507 (1965) ; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6-8.7
(1964); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 848 (1966); ORE. REV. STAT. § 146.990 (1965); S.D.
SEss. LAWS OF 1964, ch. 90; UTAH CODE ANN. § 55-16-6 (1965).
283. TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1203 (1966).
284. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 42-806 (1965).
285. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-842.01(D) (1965); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:403(E)
(1964).
286. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4330 (1965); V.I. CODE ANN. § 176 (1966).
1969]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [VOL. XXIII
and another two28 7 make the penalty a $100 fine, six months in jail or
both. Two states provide for both fine and imprisonment on an "either-
or" basis. One2"8 provides for a $500 fine or six months in jail, and the
other289 makes the punishment $100 or 30 days. The remaining states
impose only a fine upon conviction, and the amounts show considerable
variation: $10-50,29 ° $25 291 $10-100,292 $100,293 and $500.214
A variety of arguments has been made for the existence or non-
existence of punishment. Some feel that the objective of these statutes
is solely to protect children and that granting immunity to reporters
should provide incentive to report. While this view is logical, it fails
to recognize that some people need more prodding than simply the ab-
sence of possible liability. The fact remains that these people would
prefer to avoid the inconvenience of testifying before criminal or custody
proceedings and consider this a sufficient reason not to report. A statute
requiring compliance but not providing any penalty for failure to do so
is a paper dragon at most.
At the other extreme it has been suggested that the penalty for a
physician's failure to report should be loss of his license." 5 There is
little doubt that this would encourage compliance, but it is thought that
this is a substantial penalty to extract for failure to hold the same
opinion as others. There is likely to be a number of cases in which medi-
cal authorities would differ on whether the child's injuries were the result
of abuse, and it seems grossly unfair to prevent a physician from prac-
ticing because of an honest and well-reasoned difference of opinion.
Even if a relatively light penalty is attached to a failure to report,
considerable benefit would still result. The reporter who feels it incon-
venient to go to court as a witness will not be any more eager to go as a
defendant. When impressed with the importance of reporting for the
child's protection and the possibility of prosecution for failure to do so,
the physician is given an added reason to comply. The existence of
criminal penalties for not reporting also gives the physician a strong
argument to use with parents who beg for his indulgence. When the
report is made, the parents are likely to feel less animosity toward the
reporter."' These two factors speak strongly in favor of a statute with
punitive provisions.
287. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 48.981 (1965); WYo. STAT. § 14-28.6 (1963).
288. ALA. CODE tit. 27, ch. 4, § 25 (1967).
289. S.C. CODE § 20-302.4 (1965).
290. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 1006 (1965).
291. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, ch. 26, § 1355 (1965).
292. Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 199.335(6) (1966).
293. NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-484 (1965).
294. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 571:30 (1965).
295. CALIF. L. REV., supra note 18, at 1816.
296. Paulsen, supra note 91, at 9.
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I. The Child's Remedies
Closely allied with the problem of criminal penalties is that of
possible tort consequences which may result from failure to report. One
author has stated that:
it seems likely that reporting statutes which require reporting
and which carry criminal penalties create a cause of action in
favor of infants who suffer abuse after a physician has failed to
make a report respecting earlier abuse brought to his attention.
Further, the failure to comply with a mandatory statute which
is not supported by criminal penalties may well give rise to civil
liability by analogy to the cases unholding recovery based on
negligence established by a breach of the criminal law.297
The physician who has been granted immunity for reporting is likely to
find sufficient reason to report, with or without the existence of criminal
penalties, if liability may result from failure to do so. Such liability
would seem to be most likely in situations where evidence of abuse was
strong, and should not extend to situations where an honest, well rea-
soned and good faith difference of opinion existed.
In this connection it is interesting to note that though the battered
child may have a cause of action against a person who fails to report,
he generally does not have one against his parents for their intentional
tort. The general rule in this area is that the child cannot sue his parents
for intentional torts, although this rule has been relaxed somewhat with
regard to step-parents and those who stand in the place of a parent." 8
The reason for the rule is based largely on the desire to preserve peace
and tranquility in the family. As tort immunity has gradually increased
in other areas, inroads have been made into it in the area of parent and
child. In the case of Cowgill v. Boock, the court stated that "we think
the general rule... should be modified to allow an unemancipated minor
child to maintain an action for damages against his parent for a willful
or malicious personal tort."299 In explaining its reasoning, the court
added, "By the wrongful conduct of the father in overstepping the
bounds of the family relationship, the peace, security and tranquility
of the home had already been disrupted. When the reason for the rule
ceases, the rule itself ceases."3 ° In another state where the veil of
parental immunity has been pierced in cases of intentional tort, the court
said:
While it may seem repugnant to allow a minor to sue his
parent, we think it more repugnant to leave a minor child with-
297. Id. at 36.
298. W. PROSSER, supra note 249, at 886.
299. 189 Ore. 282, 301-02, 218 P.2d 445, 453 (1950).
300. Id.
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out redress for the damage he has suffered by reason of his
parent's wilful or malicious misconduct. A child, like every
other individual, has a right to freedom from such injury. Ac-
cordingly, we conclude that an unemancipated minor may sue
his parent for a wilful or malicious tort .... 301
It should be stressed that these holdings, though they seem to indicate
a trend toward abrogation of the parental immunity, represent only a
small minority view.
The difficulty with cases holding that the child may sue his parents
is that a total and complete breakdown of the family relationship is
sometimes assumed. No doubt this is sometimes true, but the social
casework method of dealing with abuse is an attempt to restructure the
family, put it back together again and restore peace and tranquility.
Where the parents are making a serious attempt to remedy the problems
which led to abuse of the child, a tort suit based on the previous conduct
may have disastrous results. It seems unrealistic to say that the suit
may be maintained if the family has disintegrated and not if it remains
intact and has been strengthened. As a practical matter, court calendars
are extremely congested in a number of states, and it may take years be-
fore the case comes to trial, a period in which the family situation should
stabilize in one way or the other. If the problems are resolved success-
fully, the suit can always be dismissed. However, it can be argued that
only a tenuous family relationship can be held together by the threat
of a lawsuit. There seems to be no one clear answer where the battered
child is involved.
One additional factor must be considered, at least from a practical
standpoint, where tort liability of the parents for battering their children
is proposed. The average abusive parent, young and financially unstable,
is not likely to be able to satisfy any sizable judgment. This is especially
true if prosecution has resulted in the parent's imprisonment. While such
a factor will not be present in all cases, it may effectively deprive the
child of a remedy even if the cause of action is permitted. Thus abroga-
tion of the parental immunity must be considered a hollow victory in a
substantial number of cases.
V. THE FLORIDA REPORTING STATUTE
The Florida reporting statute was enacted in 1963 and has remained
unchanged. 02 It is interesting to note that statutes involving cruelty to
301. Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal. 2d 421, 430, 289 P.2d 218, 224 (1955).
302. The statute, FLA. STAT. § 828.041 (1967), is as follows:
(1) PURPOSE.-The purpose of this act is to provide for the protection of
children whose health and welfare are adversely affected and further threatened
by the conduct of those responsible for their care and protection. This is often
manifest by the infliction, other than by accidental means, of physical injury requir-
ing the attention of a physician. It is intended that the mandatory reporting of such
cases by physicians and institutions to appropriate court authority will cause the
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and abuse of children are included in the same chapter with those involv-
ing cruelty to animals. It would seem that children might be considered
sufficiently important to rate a chapter of their own, but no legislative
action has been taken in pursuit of this end.
The statute starts with a lengthy purpose clause stating the manda-
tory nature of the enactment, the intention that the protective services
of the state be used to protect the children involved, and the aim to
preserve family life if possible. As Florida maintains no record of legis-
lative history, this clause is the only source to which a court could refer
for construction and interpretation. While the expressed purpose and
intent are commendable, no appropriations to carry them out appear to
have been granted. It thus seems that the funds for investigation and
protection must come either from generally appropriated state funds or
from county taxes. One possible explanation for this seeming lack of
implementation may lie in the fact that the bill became law without the
governor's signature. This apparent lack of executive commitment would
possibly have doomed a bill carrying an appropriation, and the legislators
may have preferred to at least get the bill passed even without needed
appropriations. However, even the legislative commitment seems to have
waned with the passage of time as, two governors later, nothing more
has been done. The fact remains that the promise of case-finding
legislation, such as reporting laws, is that when a case is found, some-
thing is done about it. The legislatures which require reporting but do
not provide the means for further protective action delude themselves
and neglect children.Y03
protective services of the state to be brought to bear on the situation in an effort
to prevent further abuses, protect and enhance the welfare of these children, and
preserve family life wherever possible.
(2) REPORTS BY PHYSICIANS AND INSTITUTIONS.-Any physician,
including any licensed doctor of medicine, licensed osteopathic physician, intern and
resident, having cause to believe that a child under the age of sixteen brought to him
or coming before him for examination, care or treatment has had physical injury
or injuries inflicted upon him, other than by accidental means, by a parent or
caretaker, shall report or cause reports to be made to the appropriate juvenile judge
in accordance with the provisions of this act; provided, when the attendance of a
physician with respect to a child is pursuant to the performance of services as a
member of the staff of a hospital or similar institution he shall notify the person
in charge of the institution or his designated delegate who shall report or cause
reports to be made in accordance with the provisions of this act.
(3) NATURE AND CONTENT OF REPORT.-Such reports shall be in
writing and shall contain the names and addresses of the child and his parents or
caretakers, if known, the child's age, the nature and extent of the child's injuries
(including any evidence of previous injuries), and any other information that the
physician believes might be helpful in establishing the cause of the injuries and the
identity of the perpetrator.
(4) IMMUNITY FROM LIABILITY.-Anyone participating in the making
of a report pursuant to this act or participating in a judicial proceeding resulting
therefrom shall be presumed to be acting in good faith and in so doing be immune
from any liability, civil or criminal, that might otherwise be incurred or imposed
unless the person acted in bad faith or with malicious purpose.
(5) EVIDENCE NOT PRIVILEGED.-The physician-patient privilege shall
not be a ground for excluding evidence regarding a child's injuries or the cause
thereof, in any judicial proceeding resulting from a report pursuant to this act.
(6) PENALTY.-Anyone knowingly and wilfully violating the provisions of
this act shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.
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The classes of persons required to report under the statute are
limited to physicians, who are defined as including licensed doctors of
medicine, licensed osteopathic physicians, interns and residents. Where
the examining physician is a staff member of a medical institution, the
statute requires that the information concerning the child and his injuries
be given to the person in charge of the institution who must then comply
with the statute. This places the duty on the institution as well as on the
physician.
The statute uses the objective test as to whether abuse has occurred
and requires a report if there is cause to believe that the injuries were
inflicted "other than by accidental means." In addition to requiring the
physician to guess the intent of another, the statute then necessitates that
he guess as to the perpetrator's identity as a report need be made only
if the injuries were inflicted by a parent or caretaker. While it is not too
difficult to interpret the word "parent," the word "caretaker" poses
somewhat more of a problem. If "parent" is limited to natural and adop-
tive parents, then it is easy to include step-parents and foster parents
under the heading of caretakers. However, a broad definition of "parents"
might possibly include them and then the question of who is a caretaker
becomes more difficult to answer. As no cases have arisen requiring
interpretation of the statute, it is unknown how broad an interpretation
will be given to various clauses and whether persons such as babysitters,
older siblings who might watch the child, or others with a temporary
responsibility for his welfare are included as "caretakers" under the act.
The statute further requires reporting only if the child is less than
16 years old and instructs that reports be made to the "appropriate juve-
nile judge." While the battered child is extremely likely to be under 16,
it is interesting to note that the statutes define a child as being under 17
for juvenile court purposes A04 Consistency would seem to require that the
age limit be the same as that used in the juvenile court definition of a
child, but apparently the legislature did not feel this to be necessary.
While, as a practical matter, few if any cases of abuse involving 16-year-
olds would be expected, it would seem to be just as easy to require
reporting to cover these children and to afford them protection in the
exceptional cases that might arise.
Only a written report is required in Florida, and the statute makes
no mention of an additional oral report. While it is unknown how much
reliance was placed on the Model Act, it is to be noted that other pro-
visions as to the nature and content of the report are followed almost
word for word in the Florida statute. As both the Model Act and the
statute first appeared in 1963, it is possible that neither had any influence
on the other, but it would seem more likely that the Florida legislature
303. Paulsen, supra note 91, at 48-49.
304. FLA, STAT. § 39.01(6) (1963).
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simply rejected the idea of oral reports and then followed the remainder
of the Model Act provision.
The Florida immunity provision extends to all those making a report
under the statute and includes a presumption of good faith. The im-
munity broadly covers any civil or criminal liability that might otherwise
ensue from making the report or participating in any judicial proceeding
resulting from it unless the reporter acted with bad faith or a malicious
purpose.
One of the most interesting and most puzzling parts of the statute
is the provision dealing with abrogation of evidentiary privileges, which
dispenses with the physician-patient privilege but makes no mention
of the husband-wife privilege. The unusual factor here is that neither
privilege is available in Florida anyway. Abrogation of the husband-wife
privilege has been accomplished by FLA. STAT. secs. 90.04 and 932.31,
which make spouses competent to testify against each other without
consent in civil and criminal actions respectively. As the physician-
patient privilege did not exist at common law, no statute was necessary,
and the case law 05 has specifically provided that it is not available.
This raises the question of why the reporting statute deals with the
physician-patient privilege. No clear answer is available, but a number
of theories are possible. First, most proposals in this area recommend
abrogation of the privilege, and it is possible that the provision was
included by draftsmen who were unaware of the case law. Secondly, it
is possible that it was included as something of a salve for both the physi-
cian and the parent. The medical profession has a deeply ingrained tra-
dition of confidentiality, and it may be that it was thought that a legis-
lative mandate on the subject would promote compliance with the statute.
It seems unlikely that the provision was inserted for their education as
they should be aware of a law which has such an effect on a long tradi-
tion. While the privilege should not be available to the parent anyway,
the physician might have difficulty explaining this to them and it would
no doubt be easier and more convincing for him to be able to say that
the statute compels his testimony rather than that some court decided
it. Thirdly, one commentator has suggested that the provision was in-
cluded just in case the privilege should later be allowed by statute or
case law. 06 While this is a possibility, there is no reason to assume that
such a change will occur. The medical profession has lived without the
privilege for thirty years, and it may be suggested that if the absence of
it was so offensive as to require a change that this would have happened
some time ago. Finally, the statute provides that knowing and willful
violation is a misdemeanor.
No provision is made either for the maintenance of a central registry
305. Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Bridgeman, 133 Fla. 195, 212, 182 So. 911, 191 (1938).
306. Legislation: The Battered Child: Florida's Mandatory Reporting Statute, supra
note 29, at 508.
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or for the actual processing and investigation of reports. While the legis-
lature, may have felt it best to leave the mechanics of protecting the
child to each county, it would seem better to include some mandate
along these lines rather than just expressing an intent in the purpose
clause that the child be protected. While available facilities may differ
among the counties, some general direction could easily be included in
the statute which would serve both to prod the counties to make use of
the reports for the child's benefit and provide guidelines for accomplish-
ing this result.
The Florida reporting statute is a definite step toward a commend-
able goal, but experience has shown that certain defects exist in its
structure. The legislature should benefit from this experience and act
in accordance with it for the protection of children who may not be
adequately protected at present.
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT OF STATUTES
(1) The class of persons required to report should be broadened
to include school teachers, nurses and social workers acting in an official
capacity. These people may be in a position to see a child who has been
denied medical treatment. The official capacity limitation is intended
to make their duty coterminous with their positions and is similar to
the limitation on physicians and other medical personnel requiring a
report if the child is seen or examined.
(2) No reporter should be asked to guess at the perpetrator's
identity, either to determine if a report is required or to describe the
nature of the injuries. Such information should be included in the report
only if an admission is made, and otherwise the only reference to identity
should be in a statement reporting the explained cause of the injuries
(mother states that father beat the child). Reporting the explanation
given would be useful to see if the story later changed.
(3) No reporter should be required to guess whether the injuries
were intentionally or accidentally inflicted to determine whether a report
is required as long as the child's injuries could reasonably be believed
to have resulted from abuse. This is the best left to social investigators
who will be in a better position to discover the facts.
(4) The authority designated to receive reports should be located
in the county where the child resides. This would serve to prevent hos-
pital shopping across county lines and would aid in the investigative
process.
(5) Central registries should be established both on the county
and state level with the former maintained by an agency operating
around the clock, preferably the welfare department or juvenile court.
The expense of maintaining the state registry would be that of the state,
and while state funding for the county registries would be preferable,
this could be a county expense. The maintenance expense should be
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clearly spelled out in the statute. The state registry would provide ac-
curate and up-to-date information as well as serving as a check on fam-
ilies moving about the state.
(6) Oral as well as written reports should be required. If the re-
cipient of the reports also maintained the central registry, one telephone
call would serve two purposes. Additionally, protective measures could
be undertaken immediately.
(7) Guidelines for inter-agency cooperation should be stated. While
small counties may lack some of the facilities and services available in
the larger counties, an area and duty of cooperation could be defined
to provide guidance and promote the greatest protection for the child.
(8) Physicians and institutions should be granted a complete and
unqualified immunity for reporting or taking part in judicial proceedings.
Immunity should be granted to school teachers, nurses and social
workers reporting in an official capacity in good faith, and a statutory
presumption of good faith should be added. All others who choose to
report but are not required to do so should be granted immunity if the
report is made in good faith and with reasonable cause, but no presump-
tion of good faith should attach.
(9) Injuries should not have to be serious or severe to be report-
able. What constitutes a severe injury may be a matter of opinion in
some cases, and reporting of injuries that might not be considered serious
by some might well save a child from subsequent crippling or fatal attacks.
(10) Funds should be appropriated to implement statutes.
(11) Children should be protected through the age of juvenile
court jurisdiction of the state.
(12) Family courts should be established to take the place of the
juvenile courts and also to handle other matters pertaining to the family.
Such courts could act both to protect the child and to deal with the
parents in any manner that might be necessary.
(13) In custody hearings arising after cases of abuse in which the
parents inflicted the trauma or the perpetrator remains unknown, the
state should have the burden of proving unfitness the first time. In sec-
ond and additional hearings following subsequent attacks on the child,
the parents should have the burden of proving their fitness.
In view of the foregoing analysis and recommendations for improve-
ment of child abuse reporting statutes, the following proposal is made
for enactment of a statute to remedy some of the existent problems.
While no statute can provide a solution without commitment on the part
of those covered by it, strong legislation is a step in the right direction.
In the area of child abuse, this commitment will be defeated if necessary
funds for implementation are not available. It is thus urged that each
state review its appropriations and provide the monies needed for the
protection of children threatened by abuse. Such an appropriation will
be more than repaid to the state by the preservation of the minds and
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bodies of children who might otherwise grow into helpless public charges.
The proposed statute is as follows:
Section 1. PuRIosE.-The purpose of this act is to provide for the
protection of children whose health and welfare are adversely affected
and further threatened by the abusive conduct of others. This is often
manifest by the infliction of physical injury requiring the attention of a
physician or which may come to the attention of school teachers, nurses
and social workers. It is intended that the mandatory reporting of such
cases by physicians, institutions, nurses, school teachers and social
workers to the appropriate court authority will cause the protective
services of the state to be brought to bear in an effort to prevent fur-
ther abuses, protect and enhance the welfare of these children, and pre-
serve family life wherever possible.
Section 2. REPORTS BY PHYSICIANS, INSTITUTIONS, NURSES, SCHOOL
TEACHERS AND SOCIAL WORKERS.-Any physician, including any li-
censed doctor of medicine, licensed osteopathic physician, intern and
resident, any school teacher, nurse or social worker, believing or having
reason to believe that a child under the age of - [insert maximum
age of juvenile court jurisdiction] brought to him, coming before him
for examination or seen by him in performance of his official capacity,
has had physical injury or injuries inflicted upon him, whether or not
fatal, or whose symptoms suggest maltreatment by any person, shall
report or cause reports to be made to the appropriate juvenile or family
court judge in the county where the child resides in accordance with the
provisions of this act; provided, when the attendance of a physician with
respect to a child is pursuant to the performance of services as a member
of the staff of a hospital, clinic or similar institution he shall notify the
person in charge of the institution or his designated delegate who shall
report or cause reports to be made in accordance with the provisions of
this act.
Section 3. CONSIDERATIONS IN REPORTING MALTREATMENT.-The
reporting individual should consider the following items in reporting
cases of maltreatment:
a. Characteristic age, usually under three years.
b. Characteristic distribution of fractures.
c. Disproportionate amount of soft tissue injury.
d. Evidence that injuries occurred at different times, are in different
stages of resolution.
e. Cause of recent trauma in question.
f. Suspicious family history.
g. History of previous episodes.
h. No new lesions occurring during child's hospitalization.
Section 4. NATURE AND CONTENT OF REPORT.-An oral report shall
be made immediately by telephone or otherwise, and followed as soon
thereafter as possible by a report in writing, to an appropriate juvenile
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or family court judge in the county where the child resides. Such reports
shall contain the names and addresses of the child and his parents or
other persons responsible for his care, if known, the child's age, the na-
ture and extent of the child's injuries (including any evidence of previous
injuries), the explanation given for the injuries, and any other informa-
tion that the reporter believes might be helpful in establishing the cause
of the injuries and the identity of the perpetrator.
Section 5. ESTABLISHMENT AND MAINTENANCE OF CENTRAL REG-
ISTRIES.-Central registries shall be established and maintained by the
juvenile or family court of each county and the state Department of Wel-
fare. Each county registry shall forward copies of all reports received
to the state registry after investigation has shown that the child's in-
juries were the result of abuse or maltreatment or if the cause remains
unknown. Each registry shall contain information from reports cata-
logued both as to the name of the child and the name of the family, but
any report shall be destroyed if subsequent investigation discloses that
the child's injuries were not the result of abuse or maltreatment. Access
to the information contained in the registry shall be limited to those
classes of persons and institutions required to report; provided, that the
juvenile or family court judge may, in his discretion, divulge such infor-
mation to other persons if he deems it necessary.
Section 6. COOPERATION IN INVESTIGATION OF REPORTS.-Upon
receipt of a report, the juvenile or family court judge shall cause an
investigation to be initiated into the cause of the child's injuries and the
identity of the perpetrator, if any. All state, county and local social
welfare and law enforcement agencies shall have a duty to give full
cooperation to the juvenile or family court to investigate reports and
to protect and enhance the welfare of children and siblings of children
who are the subject of any report made pursuant to this act.
Section 7. IMMUNITY FROM LIABILITY.-Any physician or institu-
tion participating in the making of a report pursuant to this act shall
have unqualified immunity from any liability, civil or criminal, that
might otherwise be incurred or imposed. Any school teacher, nurse or
social worker making a report in his official capacity pursuant to this
act shall have immunity if such report was made in good faith, from
any liability, civil or criminal, that might otherwise be incurred or im-
posed, and such reporters shall be presumed to have acted in good faith.
All other persons who report, although not required to do so by the pro-
visions of this act, shall be immune from all liability, civil or criminal,
that might otherwise be incurred or imposed if acting in good faith and
on reasonable cause. All reporters shall have the same immunity with
respect to participation in any judicial proceeding resulting from such
report as is granted for making the report.
Section 8. EVIDENCE NOT PRIVILEGED.-Neither the physician-
patient privilege nor the husband-wife privilege shall be a ground for
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excluding evidence regarding a child's injuries or the cause thereof, in
any judicial proceeding resulting from a report pursuant to this act.
Section 9. PENALTY.-Anyone knowingly and willfully violating
the provisions of this act shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.
Section 10. The provisions of this act shall be liberally construed
in order to effectively carry out the purposes of this act in the interest of
protecting and enhancing the welfare of children.
